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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), the
statute of choice in Canada for large, corporate restructurings. Specifically, this thesis
asks whether it is appropriate to effect liquidations under the CCAA. The use of the
CCAA to effect liquidations is controversial and raises fundamental questions about the
purposes of restructuring.

This thesis addresses the issue of liquidating CCAAs by

examining the history, purpose and place of the CCAA within Canada’s bankruptcy and
insolvency regime. This analysis seeks to clarify the underlying policy objectives of the
CCAA, taking into account modem restructuring theory, jurisprudence, and the 2009
amendments to the CCAA dealing with the court approval of asset sale plans. This
analysis concludes by suggesting that counsel and the courts must consider carefully the
“public interest” purpose of the CCAA that is often engaged in liquidations under the
Act.

Keywords:
Bankruptcy and insolvency; restructuring; reorganization; liquidation; Companies ’
Creditors Arrangement Act
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis focuses on the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act123 (CCAA),
which has become the restructuring statute of choice in Canada for large corporations. A
debtor company is considered insolvent when it is unable to pay its creditors. Under the
CCAA, an insolvent company with over $5 million in debt may apply for a court order
staying the debt enforcement remedies of its creditors so that the company may attempt a
#

*2

compromise with its creditors to improve its financial situation. This process is typically
known as reorganization or restructuring.4 A reorganization or restructuring may be
contrasted with liquidation, in which the assets of the insolvent company are sold to
satisfy the company’s debts. Specifically, this thesis asks two questions:
1) Are liquidations appropriate under the CCAA?
2) If so, under what circumstances?
These are controversial questions because the CCAA historically was designed to
facilitate the restructuring rather than the liquidation of insolvent companies. Recently,
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltdv Fisgard
Capital Corp held that courts should not approve the use of CCAA proceedings by a
debtor company to liquidate its assets where there is no restructuring plan.567 Similarly, the
Alberta Court of Appeal in Royal Bank v Fracmaster Ltd held that the sale of
substantially all the assets of a debtor company generally is inconsistent with the purpose
of the CCAA.

Despite these decisions, in the Nortel Networks and Canwest Global

1 Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36.
2 Roderick J Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) at 16.
3 Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36 s 3.
4 Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at para 12.
5 Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd v Fisgard Capital Corp, 2008 BCCA 327 at para 32.
6 Royal Bank v Fracmaster Ltd, 11 CBR (4th) 230 (Alta CA) at para 16.
7 Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009), 55 CBR (5th) 229 (Ont Sup Ct).
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cases, Ontario courts approved applications to sell specific assets of the debtor companies
before any restructuring plan was apparent. The different judicial approaches to CCAA
liquidations have created controversy both within the courts and in the academic
literature.8
9 In a recent article, Blair J.A. of the Court of Appeal for Ontario summarized
this controversy:10
Liquidation under an Act designed to permit compromises that would keep companies in
business'. But court support for this practice can be traced as far back as Farley J.’s
decision in Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. . . And the practice has become front and
centre in more recent years. Indeed, the debate - crystallizing around Justice Tysoe’s
decision in Cliffs Over Maple Bay - is a live topic both here today and at yesterday’s
judicial colloquium.

The issue of CCAA liquidations raises questions about the basic purposes of the
Act. This thesis addresses the issue by clarifying the underlying policy objectives of the
CCAA, taking into account current restructuring theory and case law. This analysis leads
to the conclusion that courts should approach CCAA liquidations with caution and give
careful consideration to the broad constituency of potential stakeholders in corporate
insolvencies. Liquidation under the CCAA may be appropriate in some cases, but only
where this broader constituency of interests is better served through a CCAA process
than through bankruptcy or receivership.
In Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General),11 the Supreme Court of
Canada interpreted the provisions of the CCAA for the first time since the statute was
enacted in 1933.In its decision, the Supreme Court offered the following guidance for
interpreting the CCAA:12

8 Re Canwest Global Communications Corp 2009 CarswellOnt 7169 (Ont Sup Ct).
9 See, for example, Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs - Are We Praying to False Gods?” (2008)
Annual Review o f Insolvency Law 33 at 44-45.
10 Robert Blair, “The CCAA Over 30 Years: From Chrysalis to Butterfly or Chrysalis to Gadfly? Some
Thoughts From an Appellate Perspective” [2010] Ann Rev o f Insol L 557 at 563.
11 Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60.
12 Ibid at para 16.
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In order to properly interpret the provisions, it is necessary to examine the history o f the

CCAA, its fiinction amidst the body o f insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament, and
the principles that have been recognized in the jurisprudence.

This thesis considers the origins, legislative history, policy objectives and case law of the
CCAA as well as modem restructuring theory. This analysis provides the framework for
discussing the issue of liquidation under the CCAA and for recommending solutions to
the current controversy in the courts and in the literature.
Chapter I begins by examining the origins of the CCAA as a statute designed to
enable the reorganization of insolvent companies so that they could avoid liquidation.
Parliamentary debates and the historical context of Canada’s bankruptcy system at the
time of the CCAA’s enactment in 1933 are examined.

The chapter then traces the

legislative history of the Act through various rounds of amendment from the 1950s until
the most recent amendments in 2009. This includes an analysis of early case law as well
as commentaries on the CCAA. The discussion in Chapter I provides the background for
considering the purposes of the CCAA.
Chapter II considers interpretations of the purposes of the CCAA in the case law.
Since the CCAA has no express purpose clause, judicial interpretation has played an
important role in shaping the objectives and application of the statute. The case analysis
in Chapter II builds on the discussion in Chapter I on early interpretations of the CCAA
and seeks to provide a comprehensive account of the CCAA’s basic purposes.
Additionally, Chapter II sketches the boundaries of the controversy over CCAA
liquidations. This discussion introduces some of the policy and theoretical issues that
arise as a result of CCAA liquidations, which are discussed in detail in Chapter III.
Chapter III examines competing theories of restructuring in both Canada and the
United States. A long running scholarly debate in the United States has created a rich
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body of literature on the purposes and limits of restructuring. Chapter III considers these
sources in analyzing the CCAA’s place in the context of Canada’s bankruptcy and
insolvency system. In particular, this chapter explores the “public interest” purpose of
the CCAA and the need for counsel and the courts to consider the interests of
stakeholders other than traditional creditors in CCAA proceedings. This analysis also
demonstrates how the liquidation debate raises fundamental questions about the purposes
of the CCAA and develops a theoretical framework for answering these questions.
Chapter IV discusses the 2009 amendments to the CCAA that introduced a new
provision, section 36, which deals specifically with the judicial approval of asset sales.
Chapter IV explains why section 36, in its present state, cannot adequately address the
issue of CCAA liquidations. Far from adding clarity to the current judicial analysis of
asset sales, as was intended, section 36 only adds to the confusion. Chapter IV also
suggests possible changes to section 36 to correct this problem.

This leads to the

discussion in Chapter V on the liquidation vs. reorganization debate.
Chapter V examines the liquidation vs. reorganization debate in detail.

This

chapter considers both the case law and commentary on this issue and draws on the
discussions in previous chapters of the CCAA’s history, purpose and place in Canada’s
bankruptcy and insolvency system. Chapter V distinguishes between different types of
liquidation under the CCAA - distinctions that are rarely made explicit in the case law and demonstrates why these distinctions are important to the judicial analysis. This
chapter argues that liquidations under the CCAA generally should be approached with
caution, with some liquidation scenarios being more objectionable than others. This is
because the CCAA is primarily a statute for the reorganization of insolvent companies13
13 Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36 s 36.
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and because the “public interest” purpose of the CCAA often is engaged in a liquidation
scenario. This analysis also suggests how recent case law might cause a reassessment of
the practice of allowing liquidations under the CCAA in Ontario, leading to a cautious
approach that would be more consistent with that of courts in Alberta and British
Columbia. This would be a welcome development as it would take into account a more
robust version of the “public interest” purpose of the CCAA and lead to greater certainty
in the sale approval process.

6

I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CCAA
(i) Introduction
The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Actu (CCAA) has had a long and
complicated history.

The reform process has been slow.

Recently, Parliament has

introduced amendments in a manner that can only be described as hurried and
incomplete, leaving it to the courts to determine how to apply the new provisions and to
reconcile the changes with the body of CCAA law. Nonetheless, some salient points can
be drawn from the CCAA’s legislative history. The CCAA began and was intended as a
statute for the reorganization and survival of insolvent companies.

Moreover, this

purpose is distinct from liquidation, which typically contemplates the end of the insolvent
company. Since this is a controversial point, it is important to examine the origins and
legislative history of the CCAA. A careful examination of this history illuminates the
fundamental purpose of the statute: to facilitate the rehabilitation of the insolvent
company.
(ii) Origins
TheCCAAhas its origins in the Great Depression. Enacted in 1933, the CCAA
was introduced in order to provide a legal process by which insolvent companies could
reorganize1415 themselves.

At the time, federal bankruptcy legislation allowed

14RSC 1985, c C-36.
15 The term “reorganization” is not used in the legislation. However, as Duggan et al. explain, the term has
become common in Canada and the United States to refer to the restructuring o f the debts o f an insolvent
corporation. The CCAA refers only to an “arrangement”, which generally is understood to mean an
agreement between the company and its creditors to compromise the company’s debt. Also, such
agreements may involve the restructuring o f the classes o f creditors and equity holders o f the debtor
company. See Anthony J Duggan et al, Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Cases, Text, and
Materials, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2009) at 477, fn 1. This definition is consistent with
Canadian courts’ interpretation o f the CCAA as legislation designed to allow companies to “avoid
bankruptcy and continue as ongoing concerns through a reorganization o f their financial obligations,” see
Elan Corp v Comiskey (1990), 1 CBR (3d) 101 (Ont CA). Likewise, it is generally understood that
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reorganizations only for companies that were actually bankrupt. The Tassé Report16
explains that Parliament amended TheBankruptcy Act1718in 1923 to address complaints
that debtors were bribing their creditors and using fraudulent means to obtain their
creditors’ consent for proposals in order to avoid bankruptcy.

The 1923 amendments

introduced the requirements that a debtor be declared bankrupt and hold a first meeting of
its creditors before a proposal could be made.1920By 1933, the requirement that a debtor be
declared bankrupt before a proposal could be made had met with sufficient criticism that
Parliament introduced the CCAA, which provided an alternative for insolvent companies
that wanted to reorganize.
The advent of the Great Depression necessitated legislation that enabled Canadian
companies to reorganize.

Prior to 1914, Canadian companies typically obtained

financing in England. Under English law, a majority of debenture holders of a company
could modify the terms of the company’s trust deeds. This allowed Canadian companies
with English financing to reorganize with the agreement of their creditors. However,
during the 1920s, many Canadian companies began to obtain financing in the United
States. In contrast to English law, it was uncommon for U.S. law to permit debenture
holders to modify the terms of a company’s trust deeds. Consequently, the trust deeds of
Canadian companies that had obtained financing in the United States often contained no
clauses allowing reorganization by agreement of the debenture holders.

When the

reorganizations are required to have the co-operation o f the debtor companies’ creditors and shareholders,
see Re Avery Construction Co (1942), 24 CBR 17 (Ont SC).
16 House o f Commons, Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation,
Report o f the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation (June 1970) (Chair: Roger Tassé)
[Tassé Report].
17 9-10 Geo V, Can S 1919, C 36.
18 Ibid at 1.2.21. See also The Bankruptcy Act Amendment Act, 1923, 13-14 Geo V, Can S 1923, C 31.
19 Ibid.
20 Tassé Report, supra note 3 at 1.2.19. See also Duggan et al, supra note 2 at 15-22.
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Depression forced many companies into insolvency, it was discovered that the terms of
their trust deeds did not allow them to reorganize, “[often] to the embarrassment of the
directors.”21 As a result, these insolvent companies were faced with bankruptcy.
(iii) Structure and Objectives
The CCAA was modeled on the provisions of the English Companies Act o f
1929.2223At the first reading of the CCAA in the House of Commons, the Hon. C.H.
Cahan, then Secretary of State, explained that the legislation was intended to allow an
insolvent company to avoid bankruptcy and to survive by reorganizing.

The Secretary

explained that some method of reorganization was needed because of the large number of
companies trying to reorganize as a result of the Depression:24
At the present time, some legal method o f making arrangements and compromises
between creditors and companies is perhaps more necessary because o f the prevailing
commercial and industrial depression and it was thought by the government that we
should adopt some method whereby compromises might be carried into effect under the
supervision o f the court without utterly destroying the company orbits organization
without loss o f good will and without forcing the improvident sales o f its assets.

The economic context of the CCAA’s enactment during the Depression is significant. In
his seminal article “Reorganizations Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement
Act 25 Stanley Edwards reiterated the Hon. C.H. Cahan’s remarks on the CCAA and
emphasized the legislation’s importance in providing a reorganization procedure for
companies to continue as “ongoing concerns”2627 in the event of future economic
downturns.

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid at 1.2.21. See also Duggan et al, supra note 2 at 478.
23 House o f Commons Debates, 17th Parliament, 4th Session, Vol 4 (1933) at 4090 (Hon CH Cahan).
24 Ibid
25 Stanley E Edwards, (1947) 25 Can Bar Rev 587.
26 In other words, to emerge from insolvency and continue functioning as a business without the threat o f
liquidation.
27 Ibid at 590.

9

Initially, the CCAA was intended to facilitate arrangements between companies
and their secured creditors only.2829 Secured creditors were protected both by the
legislation itself and by the terms of most trust deeds, which gave indenture trustees the
right to intervene in the debtor’s affairs on certain conditions.

Institutional investors

also had the power to intervene to prevent serious abuses. However, unsecured creditors
lacked the protections available to them in the Bankruptcy Act, resulting in abuses that
led to significant reforms of the CCAA in 1953.
(iv) Early Reform Attempts
In the years following its enactment, some insolvent companies began using the
CCAA to make arrangements with their unsecured creditors as an alternative to using the
Bankruptcy Act. Since the CCAA lacked the proper procedure for such arrangements,
unsecured creditors were left vulnerable to insolvent companies making false and
misleading statements to induce acceptance of unfair proposals.30 Trade creditors were
particularly upset that debtor companies were using the CCAA to escape their mercantile
liabilities.31 Consequently, in 1938, Parliament considered repealing the CCAA.32
However, the Dominion Mortgage and Investment Association strongly opposed the
repeal of the CCAA, chiefly because U.S. law prohibited the sale of securities that did not
have associated legislation enabling holders of those securities to effect a reorganization
of the company.33 Since the CCAA was the only statute by which Canadian companies
could reorganize, this would make it impossible for these companies to obtain financing

28 Tassé Report, supra note 3 at 1.2.23.
'
29 Ibid at 1.2.24.
30 Ibid at 1.2.23.
31 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (Toronto:
Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 14.

32 Ibid.
33 House o f Commons Debates, 21st Pari, 7th Sess, Vol 2 (1952-1953) at 1269.
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in the United States, or for security holders of these companies to sell their securities in
the United States. Plans to repeal the CCAA were stalled while debates about the debtor
company’s control over the reorganization process continued for several years.34356
In 1946, new efforts at reform led to Bill A5, which proposed to repeal the CCAA
and to bring all corporate reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act.

However, Bill A5

contained no provisions to address the situation of investor creditors. In particular, no
provision was made for representation orders - allowing groups of creditors to be
represented in reorganization proceedings - and the legislation required that service be
made on all creditors, which was often impossible.

Once again, the Dominion Mortgage

and Investments Association opposed the repeal of the CCAA, instead suggesting
amendments that would restrict the CCAA’s application to proposed arrangements that
affected a debtor company’s outstanding issue of bonds or debentures as a way of
addressing the concerns of unsecured creditors.37 While the Bankruptcy Act was amended
in 1949,38 plans to repeal the CCAA were abandoned. Notably, the new Bankruptcy Act
contained provisions allowing an insolvent person to make a proposal without being
bankrupt.39
(v) 1953 Amendments
Following several years of intermittent debate, Parliament enacted amendments to
the CCAA in 1953 according to the recommendations of the Dominion Mortgage and
Investments Association. The CCAA’s application was restricted to a debtor company
34 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (Toronto:
Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 14.
35 Senator Fogo outlined these amendments, contained in Bill A5, during debates preceding the Bankruptcy
Act o f 1949. Debates o f the Senate, 21st Pari, 2nd Sess (1949) at 97 (Hon James Gordon Fogo).
36 Tassé Report, supra note 3 at 1.2.25.
37 Ibid at 1.2.26.
j8 Bankruptcy Act, 1949, 13 Geo VI, Can S 1949 (2nd Sess), C 7.
39 Debates o f the Senate, 21st Pari, 2nd Sess (1949) at 97 (Hon James Gordon Fogo).
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with an outstanding debenture issue that wanted to make a proposal to its debenture
holders.40 These amendments reinforced the intentions of the original drafters of the
CCAA to facilitate arrangements between insolvent companies and their secured
creditors. The Hon. Stuart S. Garson, then Minister of Justice, explained:41
The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act was passed in 1933. At that time, the
Bankruptcy Act did not contain adequate provisions for an arrangement between a
corporate debtor and its creditors by which the corporate debtor, by getting an extension
o f its liabilities, could liquidate them, avoid bankruptcy and retain its identity. . . The
Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act was passed to enable these corporate debtors to
make an extension o f that sort without going into bankruptcy.

The Minister further stated that both trade creditors and investor creditors had approved
of the 1953 amendments, and that the new bill would “leave companies that have
complex financial structures... able to use the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act for
the purpose of reorganization.”42
Following these amendments, the CCAA fell into disuse for over thirty years.
Writing in 1970, the Tassé Committee explained that the CCAA had worked well in its
early years and “gave general satisfaction to investors and companies with secured
indebtedness who wished to make arrangements with their creditors.”43 However, the
CCAA became far less popular after its use was restricted in 1953. Moreover, by 1970, it
had become common for trust indentures to include terms permitting the contractual
reorganization of the debtor company without recourse to the CCAA.44
(vi) The Tassé Committee

40 An Act to Amend the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, 1-2 El II, Can S 1952-53, C 3.
41 House o f Commons Debates, 21st Pari, 7th Sess, Vol 2 (1952-1953) at 1269.
42 Ibid
43 Tassé Report, supra note 3 at 1.2.23.
44 Ibid at 1.2.28.
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Criticism of the 1949 Bankruptcy Act as obsolete, inefficient, and unable to cope
with fraudulent bankruptcies led to a new round of reforms in 1966.45 With AnAct to
Amend the Bankruptcy Act,46 Parliament introduced amendments granting the court the
right to appoint an interim receiver and providing that an insolvent person would be
assigned into bankruptcy if the creditors or the court refused to approve the proposal.47
At the same time, the federal government also formed the Study Committee on
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation (Tassé Committee) and commissioned a report
recommending further changes to Canada’s bankruptcy regime. The Tassé Committee
presented its report to the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in June 1970.48
Among its many recommendations for reforming Canada’s bankruptcy and
insolvency regime, the Tassé Report suggested repealing the CCAA and including a
procedure for reorganizing insolvent companies in a new, integrated bankruptcy and
insolvency statute.49 However, Parliament did not implement this recommendation. In
fact, six bankruptcy bills were unsuccessfully introduced into Parliament between 1970
and 1984, with each attempt failing to bring about the intended “sweeping reform of the
bankruptcy system.”50 In particular, the federal government found it difficult to respond
to the intense lobbying of numerous competing special interest groups.51 Pressure from
these groups increased following many business collapses during the recession in the
1980s. At the same time, the government lacked sufficient information, in the form of

45 House o f Commons, Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Report o f the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency (January 1986) (Chair: Gary F Colter) [Colter Report] at 18.
4614-15 El II, Can S 1966-67, C 32.
47 Ibid, ss 7 and 8.
48 Tassé Report, supra note 3.
49 Ibid at 81.
50 Colter Report, supra note 32 at 18.
51 Jacob S Ziegel, “The Travails o f Bill C-12” (1983-1984) 8 CBLJ 374 at 375.
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legal and economic studies, to formulate policy.5253Consequently, the government adopted
Cl

an approach that Jacob Ziegel has called a “phased-in program of reform”. Rather than
pursue a “single massive overhaul” of insolvency legislation, subsequent governments
have favoured piecemeal reform.54 As discussed below, this phased-in program of reform
ultimately led to the development of Canada’s bifurcated system for business
reorganizations.55
(vii) The Colter Committee
Following the string of failures to enact a new, comprehensive bankruptcy statute,
the federal government determined that a more modest reform effort might succeed. The
Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs convened the Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Colter Committee) to recommend the most urgent
amendments to the existing legislation.56 Meanwhile, the government proceeded with a
consolidation of the Bankruptcy Act, leading to passage of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act (BIA)in 1985.5758
The Colter Committee completed its report in 1986, and the government largely
adopted its recommendations in the 1992 amendments to the BIA. Among these changes
to the BIA were: increased protections for wage earners,

co

changes to the proposal

procedures to stay secured creditors,59 and new provisions dealing with international

52 Ibid.
53 Jacob S Ziegel, “Canada’s Phased-in Bankruptcy Law Reform” (1996) 70 Am Bankr LJ 383 at 383.
54 Jacob S Zeigel, “The Modernization o f Canada’s Bankruptcy Law in a Comparative Context” (1999) 4
CBR (4th) 151 at 151.
55 For a summary o f Professor Ziegel’s articles and concerns about the reform process, see Thomas GW
Telfer, “Canadian Insolvency Law Reform and ‘Our Bankrupt Legislative Process’” [2010] Ann Rev of
Insol Law 583.
56 Ibid.
_
_
_
57 Bankruptcy and Insolvency /lctRSCi985cB3[as amended25c47~]
58 Colter Report, supra note 32 at 21.
59 Ibid at 56.
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insolvencies.60 These amendments addressed some of the most pressing concerns of the
Colter Committee and brought the BIA up to date, but they did not deal with the issue of
CCAA and BIA integration.
Significantly, the Colter Report did not revive the Tassé Report’s earlier
recommendation to repeal the CCAA. By 1986, after years of relative obscurity, the
CCAA came into use again as a mechanism for facilitating large corporate
reorganizations. In the period between 1986 and 1992, Canadian courts employed the
CCAA’s skeletal provisions to creatively and successfully reorganize many medium and
large sized corporations. In 1992, the House of Commons Committee examining Bill C226162recommended repealing the CCAA within three years following the enactment of
new provisions for business reorganizations in Part III. 1 of the BIA.

However, many

insolvency practitioners opposed the repeal of the CCAA, as they had come to favour the
more flexible reorganization process in the CCAA over that in Part III. 1 of the BIA.63
The government decided not to repeal the CCAA until the new reorganization provisions
in the BIA had been tested.64
(vin) The 1997 Amendments
In 1993, Industry Canada established the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
Advisory Committee (BIAC) to recommend amendments to the BIA.

The federal

government adopted many of the Committee’s recommendations in Bill C-5, amending

60 Ibid at 99.
61 Bill C-22, 34th Pari, 3rd Sess (1991). This amending act became law in 1992 as the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act, RSC 1992, c C-27.
62 House o f Commons, Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government
Operations, “Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence”, “Pre-Study o f Bill C-22” in Official Report of
Debates (Hansard), N o 15 (7 October 1991) at 14.
63 Duggan et al, supra note 2 at 478.
64 Jacob S Ziegel, “Canada’s Phased-In Bankruptcy Law Reform” (1996) 70 Am Bankr LJ 383.
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both the BIA and the CCAA in 1997.65 As they had done in 1992, insolvency
practitioners successfully opposed the CCAA’s repeal on the grounds that it provided the
necessary flexibility for large, complex reorganizations.66
Among the more important changes introduced to the CCAA in 1997 were: new
provisions restricting the CCAA’s application to corporate debtors with at least $5
million in debt; removal of the requirement in s. 3 for an outstanding issue of debentures
or bonds and a trust deed in order to use the CCAA; new requirements for a courtappointed monitor to protect creditors’ interests and report to the court while the debtor
prepares a plan for the creditors to vote on; and provisions recognizing foreign
insolvencies and allowing Canadian courts to assist foreign insolvency administrators.67
Far from providing for the repeal of the CCAA, these amendments reinvigorated the
CCAA and firmly established a bifurcated system for business reorganizations in
Canada.68
fix) Industry Canada Report (2002)
The 1997 amendments contemplated further changes to Canadian bankruptcy
laws in the future.

Importantly, the federal government was required to report to

Parliament on the operation of the BIA and CCAA within 5 years.

In 2002, Industry

Canada published its Report on the Operation and Administration o f the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act and the Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act.69*In this report, Industry
Canada cautioned that while the 1997 amendments had introduced substantive changes,
they fell short of comprehensive reforms, and many issues remained to be addressed.
65 Bill C-5, SC 1997, c 12.
66 Jacob S Ziegel, “Canada’s Phased-In Bankruptcy Law Reform” (1996) 70 Am Bankr LJ 383 at 397.
67 Ibid. See also Duggan et al, supra note 2 at 18 for further discussion o f these amendments.
68 Jacob S Ziegel, “Canada’s Phased-In Bankruptcy Law Reform” (1996) 70 Am Bankr LJ 383 at 396.
69 Industr y Canada, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, Policy Sector (Ottawa: Industry Canada,
2002).
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Specifically, the report cited the problem that CCAA reorganizations were not subject to
an administrative supervision process:70
[It is] practically impossible to assess procedures under the CCAA or to verify whether
services are being performed properly...to measure the effectiveness o f the
reorganization schemes or to verify whether they are being applied and administered
consistently.

Additionally, the absence of a centralized public database of CCAA reorganizations made
it very difficult “to determine which companies use the CCAA in a given year... [and] to
ascertain their profiles or how successful their reorganization processes were.”

The

report further warned that there were no formal qualification requirements or rules of
professional conduct for CCAA monitors and that many stakeholders had expressed
concerns about the “numerous potential conflicts of interest [monitors] might face,
especially if they are acting in various other capacities for the debtor company.”*
72
Stakeholders estimated at the time that the CCAA was used in “upwards of 50 cases a
year, with a typical case involving in excess of $100 million in assets.”73 However,
without concrete data, the report concluded that it was “impossible to measure the impact
of the CCAA’s use on the Canadian economy.”74
(xf Senate Committee Report (2003) and Bills C-55 and C-62
The Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce was charged with
reviewing the BIA and CCAA in accordance with the requirements of the 1997
amendments. Its 2003 report, entitled Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A
Review o f the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies’ Creditors
10 Ibid at 18.
11 Ibid at 19.
12 Ibid
73 Ibid at 40.
74 Ibid. The report suggested the implementation o f several changes to increase the transparency o f the
CCAA reorganization process, such as: the establishment o f a national public registry, mechanisms for
addressing complaints, and requirements for monitors. However, no specific legislative proposals were
made.
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Arrangement Act,15 contained 34 recommendations related to commercial insolvency
law.

In June of 2005, the government introduced Bill C-55, which proposed to

implement most of the Senate committee’s recommendations. Unfortunately, the bill was
widely criticized for its hurried drafting and was rushed through Parliament without
debate in the final days of the Martin government in 2005.

The Senate Committee also

expressed its disappointment with the House’s treatment of the Bill, stating:757677
We recognize the extraordinary circumstances that exist with the impending dissolution
o f Parliament, but believe we had an inadequate opportunity to review comprehensively
such an important piece o f framework legislation.

The Senate agreed to pass Bill C-55 with the understanding that the government would
delay proclamation until the bill’s shortcomings could be addressed with additional
revisions. Upon enactment, Bill C-55 became Chapter 47 of the Statutes of Canada.7879
Revisions came in June of 2007, when the new Harper government tabled Bill C62.

Although the House passed Bill C-62, it died on the Order Paper when Parliament

was prorogued on September 14, 2007. It was reintroduced later as Bill C-12, which the
House passed on October 27 of the same year, and was referred to the Senate Committee

75 Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the
Burden: A Review o f the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
(November 2003) (Chair: Richard H Kroft) [Senate Committee Report].
76 Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Anthony Duggan, Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Bill C-55, Statute
c. 47 and Beyond, (Markham: LexisNexis, 2007) at 5. The authors also cite, among others, Insolvency
Institute o f Canada (IIC), News Release, “Insolvency Experts Say Proposed Legislation is Flawed” (17
November 2005), online:
<http://www.insolvency.ca/papers/Bill%20C-55%20Press%20Release%20for%20IIC_fmal-Novl7.pdf>;
IIC, Position Paper on Bill C-55 (12 October 2005), online:
<http://www.insolvency.ca/papers/IIC%20Position%20Paper%20re%20Bill%20C-55_Oct%2012.pdf>.
77 Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, “Seventeenth Report” in Official Report
o f Debates (Hansard), (24 November 2005).
78 Ben-Ishai and Duggan, supra note 60 at 6.
79 An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the
Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 o f the Statutes o f Canada, 2005, 13 June 2007.
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on Banking, Trade and Commerce on November 15.80 Following enactment it became
Chapter 3681 and its provisions came into effect, at last, on September 18, 2009.
Together, Bill C-55 and Bill C-12 introduced notable changes to both the BIA and
the CCAA, including: provision for employee wages and pension payments before a
court can approve a CCAA plan, provision for the assignment and disclaimer of leases in
the BIA and CCAA, codification of interim or debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing
procedures, and new cross-border insolvency provisions introducing a modified version
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.8283
Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, Parliament also amended the
CCAA to introduce provisions governing the court approval of asset sales.

oi

The new

section 36 seems to permit not only reorganizations, but also liquidations in which the
debtor company ceases to exist. This is surprising in light of the discussion of the
CCAA’s history thus far - in fact, there is nothing in its legislative history until recently
to suggest that the CCAA might be used to effect wholesale liquidations of companies.
Interpreting the CCAA’s provisions for the first time in Reference re Companies’
Creditors Arrangement Act,8485the Supreme Court of Canada never contemplated that the
CCAA would be used for anything but reorganization.

More recently, in Century

80 “Background” o f Bill C-12: An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies'
Creditors Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 o f the Statutes o f
Canada, 2005, Parliament o f Canada Virtual Library, Law and Government Division, 14 December 2007.
Online:
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/Bills_ls.asp?lang=E&ls=cl2&source=library_pr
b&Parl=3 9& Ses=2>.
81 An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the
Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 of the Statutes o f Canada, 2005, 39th Pari, 1st Sess
(27 October 2007).
82 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Model Lcrw on Cross-Border Insolvency, GA
Res 52/158, arts 25-27, UN Doc A/Res/52/158 (Jan 30, 1998).
83 S 36.
84 [1934] SCR 659.
85 Ibid at para 4.
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Serviceslnc. v. Canada (Attorney General),

O/"

the Supreme Court reaffirmed this

interpretation of the CCAA’s basic purpose:8687
The purpose o f the CCAA - Canada’s first reorganization statute - is to permit the debtor
to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs
o f liquidating its assets.

(xi) Recent Developments
In order to understand the CCAA’s evolution and its significance in Canada’s
bankruptcy and insolvency regime, it is useful to consider some data on the number of
CCAA cases. In a 2006 report to the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada
(OSB), Janis Sarra presented a model to track filings and collect data on CCAA
proceedings.8889Previously, Industry Canada had estimated that there were about 175 total
cases under the CCAA between 1983 and 2005. Sarra’s study identified 219 cases in
those years. By contrast, there are only 7 known CCAA cases prior to 1983, all from the
early years of the Act before it fell into disuse for roughly forty years.

OQ

Since the mid-1980s, the CCAA has become the restructuring statute of choice in
Canada. Also, data on the number of CCAA filings in recent years show that the rate of
filings is increasing. Although there is no comprehensive database of all CCAA cases,
the OSB has recorded all companies granted CCAA protection since September 18, 2009.
As of June 6, 2011, the OSB reports that over 60 companies have been granted CCAA

86 2010 SCC 60.
87 Ibid at para 15. See also paras 14 and 23.
88 Janis Sarra, Development o f a Model to Track Filings and Collect Data for Proceedings under the
CCAA, Final Report to the Office o f the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (March 2006). Online:
<http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf7eng/br01669.html>
89 Janis Sarra, “The Evolution o f the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act in Light o f Recent
Developments” forthcoming in (2011) 50 CBLJ.
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protection.90 This is a significant increase in the rate of filings from the 219 cases
recorded between 1983 and 2005 in Janis Sarra’s study.
Perhaps the most cited reason for the CCAA’s popularity is its flexibility and the
broad discretion that it grants to the supervising judge. In ATB Financial v. Metcalfe &
Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp,91the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:
It is beyond controversy, however, that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be liberally
construed. . . It is designed to be a flexible instrument and it is that very flexibility which
gives the Act its efficacy.

This flexibility and broad judicial discretion has had a profound impact on the CCAA’s
evolution.

The academic literature often refers to the “skeletal nature” of the

legislation.92 The CCAA has been called a “relatively short, bare statute.”93 In many
ways, then, the history of the CCAA is a history of courts “fleshing out” the bare-bones
provisions of the Act. The CCAA has flourished in these circumstances, its flexibility
leading to its use in the largest, most complex Canadian restructurings of the last 25
years. Given the importance of judicial interpretation to the CCAA’s development, it is
perhaps unsurprising that many of the recent amendments to the Act are regarded largely
as codifications of practices already well established in the courts.94
(xii) Conclusion
An examination of the CCAA’s origins and legislative history shows that the
CCAA began as a statute intended to facilitate reorganizations rather than liquidations.
This emphasis on reorganization and the survival of the debtor company is evident not
90 Online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br02281 .html#Chronological>
91 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont CA), leave to appeal refused. See also Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating
CCAAs - Are We Praying to False Gods?” [2008] Ann Rev Insol L 33.
92 Among others, see Sarra, supra note 72. See also Fitzpatrick, supra at 44.
93 Bill Kaplan, “Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?” [2008] Annual Rev Insol L at 79.
94 For example, see Re SemCanada Crude Co (2009), ABQB 490 at para 44, in which the court states that
the 2009 amendments to the CCAA do not change in any material way the factors already established in the
case law for approval o f a classification for voting purposes. See also para.16, in which the court explains
that these factors were developed over time in the case law and in the absence o f statutory guidance.
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only in the Parliamentary records when the CCAA was introduced, but also in the early
commentaries and the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Act. However, the CCAA’s
flexibility and its frequent use in recent years has led to the development of a rich body of
case law interpreting the Act.95 The detailed history of the CCAA in this chapter provides
a crucial backdrop for examining this case law, particularly on the issue of whether courts
should allow liquidations under the Act. This will be discussed in Chapter II.

95 See, for example, Farley J.’s statement that “[t]he history o f CCAA law has been an evolution o f judicial
interpretation”, Re Dylex Ltd (1995), 3 CBR (3d) 106 at 111 (Ont Gen Div).
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II. THE PURPOSE OF THE CCAA
(I) Introduction
The CCAA has no express purpose clause.

Only its long title, “An Act to

facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors,” gives
some indication of Parliament’s purpose in enacting it, while section 3 specifies that the
Act applies only to insolvent companies with over $5 million in debt.96 With this general
goal in mind, it has been left to the courts to determine much of the CCAA’s application
and specific powers.
It is often observed that the CCAA is “a skeleton piece of legislation” that the
courts have fleshed out over time.97 While judicial interpretation has played a key role in
the CCAA’s development, it is important to recall that the CCAA began its life as a
Depression-era statute intended to facilitate the reorganization and survival of insolvent
companies, so as to avoid the negative social and economic consequences of
bankruptcy.98

In interpreting the CCAA over time, courts have given careful

consideration to these origins and the remedial purposes of the legislation. At the same
time, while the CCAA is a federal statute, there has been variation in the way the courts
of the different provinces have interpreted and applied it with respect to liquidations.
This chapter will provide an overview of some of the leading decisions interpreting the
scope, powers and purpose of the CCAA. It will go on to examine the divergence in
judicial interpretations with respect to liquidations under the CCAA.
(iil Early Interpretations of the Act

96 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36 s 3.
97 Re Dylex Ltd ( 1995), 31 CBR (3d) 106 at para 10 (Ont Gen Div).
98 House o f Commons Debates, 17th Pari, 4th Sess, Vol 4 (1933) at 4090 (Hon CH Cahan). See also
Stanley E Edwards, “Reorganizations Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act” (1947) 25 Can
Bar Rev 587.
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The CCAA itself contains little guidance as to Parliament’s intent or how the
legislation should be interpreted. Although it was enacted in 1933, the CCAA has spent
most of its life in obscurity, only emerging as the restructuring statute of choice in
Canada in the 1980s." As such, there is little in the way of guidance on how to interpret
the CCAA from cases before 1980.

However, a few early cases and scholarly

commentaries offer some insight into the objectives of the legislation.
In Reference re Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act,99100 the Attomeys-General
for Québec and Ontario asked the Supreme Court of Canada whether the CCAA was
constitutionally valid legislation.

The year was 1934, shortly after Parliament had

enacted the legislation, and it was one of the few times that the Supreme Court has
considered the CCAA’s purpose.101102In its decision, the Court unanimously upheld the
legislation as a proper exercise of Parliament’s power under sec. 91(21) of the British
1 A -l

North America Act

in the field of bankruptcy and insolvency. The justices understood

the CCAA to be a statute dealing with “compositions and arrangements” and called it “a
proper component of a system of bankruptcy and insolvency law” that co-existed with,
but was separate from, other bankruptcy legislation at the time. With regards to the basic
purpose of the CCAA, Duff C.J.C., stated:103
[T]he aim o f the Act is to deal with the existing condition o f insolvency in itself to enable
99 Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at para 19.
100 [1934] SCR 659.
101 Many years later, on a procedural motion in Re Westar Mining Ltd, [1993] 2 SCR 448, the Supreme
Court held that it had the jurisdiction to hear appeals in CCAA cases. On December 16, 2010, the Supreme
Court released its reasons for decision in Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60.
This is the first case in which the Supreme Court has considered the CCAA’s purpose since 1934. Later in
2011, the Supreme Court is expected to hear the appeal o f Re AbitibiBowater Inc, 2010 QCCS 1742 (Que
Sup Ct), in which the paramountcy o f the federal regime under the CCAA will again be pitted against
provincial legislation, this time in the form o f provincial fines for environmental damage against a
company undergoing CCAA restructuring.
102 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3. This is now the Constitution Act, 1982,
Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, c 11 (UK) [RSC, 1985, Appendix II, No 44],
103 Reference re Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act [1934] SCR 659 at paras 4 and 7.
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arrangements to be made in view o f the insolvent condition o f the company under judicial
authority which, otherwise, might not be valid prior to the initiation o f proceedings in
bankruptcy.

[...]
The ultimate purpose would appear to be to enable the Court to sanction a compromise
which, although binding upon a class o f creditors only, would be beneficial to the general
body o f creditors as well, it may be, as to the shareholders.

In concurring but separate reasons, Cannon and Lamont JJ. also reflected on the nature
and purpose of the legislation:104
[i]f the proceedings under this new Act o f 1933 are not, strictly speaking, "bankruptcy"
proceedings, because they had not for object the sale and division o f the assets o f the
debtor, they may, however, be considered as "insolvency proceedings" with the object of
preventing a declaration o f bankruptcy and the sale o f these assets, if the creditors
directly interested for the time being reach the conclusion that an opportune arrangement
to avoid such sale would better protect their interest, as a whole or in part.

The above statements are significant because of the clear distinction they draw between
the bankruptcy regime, which deals with liquidation, and the CCAA, which is an
insolvency statute intended to facilitate the survival of an insolvent company.
Bankruptcy deals with the distribution of the property of a bankrupt - an “insolvent
person”105 who has committed an act of bankruptcy - among his creditors. On the other
hand, the CCAA deals with insolvency proceedings that seek to prevent a bankruptcy and
the sale of these assets.106 At the same time, these statements in Re CCAA take a narrow
interpretation on a possible “public interest” purpose for the statute. That is, the Supreme
Court in Re CCAA makes no mention of the public interest in preventing the negative
social and economic consequences of corporate failure, such as the loss of jobs or of
valuable goods and services. The reason for this narrow reading of the CCAA’s purpose
may be that Re CCAA was primarily concerned with constitutional interpretation rather

104 Reference re Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, [1934] SCR 659 at para 17 (emphasis added).
105 Including an insolvent corporation, see Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 s 2.
106 Reference re Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, [1934] SCR 659 at paras 16-17.
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than interpretation of the statute itself. Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, the
public interest is an important consideration under the CCAA.
In the seminal 1947 article “Reorganizations Under The Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act,”107*Stanley Edwards discussed in detail the CCAA and the various
considerations that arise in reorganizations.

Broadly, Edwards saw the underlying

purpose of the CCAA being to protect an insolvent company so that it could reorganize,
survive and avoid the negative consequences of liquidation.

Restructuring under the

CCAA might be more beneficial to a company and its stakeholders than liquidation for
several reasons: the going concern value of the company might be greater than the
liquidation value of its individual business units; the value of the company’s reputation
and relationships with customers and suppliers might be lost on liquidation; various other
intangible assets might be lost on liquidation; and it might be difficult to find a buyer
willing to pay the company’s going concern value in a liquidation.109 For example,
Edwards suggested that it would be difficult to sell a very large company on a going
concern basis to a single purchaser. It may be equally difficult for companies to sell
specific assets in industries with very few potential buyers, particularly in depressed
industries.
Edwards emphasized the importance of both the purpose of the CCAA and
“several fundamental principles which may serve to accomplish that purpose.”110
Certainly, one aim of reorganization was to benefit creditors in situations where they
would otherwise realize little or no satisfaction of their interests through liquidation. But

107
108

(1947) 25 Can Bar Rev 587.

Ibid at 592.
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid
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another important reason to favour reorganization, in Edwards’ view, was the public
interest in the debtor company’s survival. Where the debtor company supplied valuable
goods or services, or employed many workers, courts had to consider the broader social
and economic consequences of restructuring:111
It thus becomes apparent that consumer, investor and labor groups as well as the public
generally are interested in reorganizations, and accordingly their welfare should be kept
in mind by those who are supervising that procedure.

Edwards also discussed the principles of “feasibility” and “fairness” that judges should
take into account, in addition to the CCAA’s purpose, when considering proposed
arrangements under the Act.

Importantly, Edwards concluded that Parliament had

granted judges a fairly broad discretion in considering whether to approve a proposal
under the Act by allowing them “to devise their own rules and criteria for the purpose.”11213
In Edwards’ view, although the CCAA had been modeled in part on section 153 of the
English Companies Act,

in

there was no evidence that the Canadian Parliament had in

mind any particular test - such as those established under English common law - that it
intended for judges to apply in deciding CCAA cases. Thus, it was left to judges in
CCAA proceedings to determine whether a plan was fair and equitable and should be
approved in any given case.
Both Edwards and the Supreme Court, writing in Re CCAA, agreed on the basic
purpose of the CCAA: to avoid a bankruptcy by allowing an insolvent company to
reorganize.

However, Edwards departed noticeably from the Supreme Court’s

interpretation by introducing the concept of the “public interest,” a term that is never
mentioned in the Supreme Court’s decision. Significantly, the Supreme Court made no

111 Ibid at 593.
112 Ibid at 614.
113 Companies Act 1929 (UK), 19 & 20 Geo V c 23. This is now the Companies Act 2006 (UK), c. 46.
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mention of the employees and communities that would suffer in the event of large
business failures. Instead, the Supreme Court interpreted the CCAA narrowly, focusing
on the legislative purpose of allowing courts to sanction compromises for the general
benefit of creditors.114 Nonetheless, the social and economic consequences of large
corporate bankruptcies were key factors in Parliament’s decision to enact the CCAA.
Indeed, it was precisely because of the negative economic and social consequences
arising from the wholesale liquidation of a large company - a common Depression-era
bankruptcy scenario - that Parliament thought some legislation was required to allow
insolvent companies to reorganize and survive.115
A final point is that that neither Parliament, the Supreme Court, nor Edwards
foresaw the possibility that the CCAA would develop and evolve over time such that the
statute might be used to effect the wholesale liquidation of a company’s assets, since such
a scenario at that time would only occur under bankruptcy, and not insolvency
proceedings.
fiii) Modern Interpretations (1980s - Present) - The Courts of the Provinces
Canadian courts have generally adopted a broad, liberal interpretation of the
CCAA’s provisions. This is in keeping with the rule of statutory interpretation in section
12 of the Interpretation Act:116
Enactments deemed remedial
12. Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal
construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment o f its objects.

In Re Chef Ready Foods Ltd.,117the British Columbia Court of Appeal specifically

114 Re Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, [1934] SCR 659 at para 7.
115 House o f Commons Debates, 17th Pari, 4th Sess, Vol 4 (1993) at 4090 (Hon CH Cahan).
116 RSC 1985, c 1-21.
117 Hongkong Bank o f Canada v Chef Ready Foods Ltd (1990), 4 CBR (3)311 (BCCA).
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acknowledged the judicial preference for a liberal approach and held that the CCAA’s
“broad scope” prevailed in any apparent conflict between the CCAA’s provisions and
those of the federal Bank Act.118 1920T
he Court reaffirmed that this was the correct approach
in Quintette Coal Ltd v. Nippon Steel,119 citing Chef Ready Foods and upholding a lower
court decision that the stay provisions in section 11 of the CCAA were to be read so as to
give the court “broad powers.. .to assist reorganization.”

190

Similar statements about the need for a liberal interpretation of the CCAA and the
court’s powers under the Act are commonly found in Ontario court decisions. In Elan
Corp. v. Comiskey

, 1 2 1 12

Doherty J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal, citing Chef Ready

Foods with approval, stated that “the Act must be given a wide and liberal construction”
in fulfilling its purpose of facilitating a reorganization.

In Re Lehndorff General

Partner Ltd., 123Farley J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice explained:1241256
The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies
and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation
entitled to a liberal interpretation.

Farley J. reiterated this explanation in the more recent Re Air Canada

me

case, and this

decision continues to be cited commonly for its statement of the CCAA’s purpose.
The above statements are consistent with the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision
in Re Smoky River Coal}26 In that decision, the Court of Appeal cited both Re Lehndorff
and QuintetteCoal in holding that the CCAA required a broad and liberal

118 In the result, the court held that the CCAA’s stay provisions applied equally to creditors holding section
178 securities under the Bank Act, SC 1991 c 46.
119 (1990), 51 BCLR (2d) 105 (BCCA).
120 Affirming Quintette Coal Ltd v Nippon Steel (1990), 47 BCLR (2d) 193 (BC Sup Ct).
121 Elan Corp v Comiskey (1990), 1 CBR (3d) 101 (Ont CA), dissenting on other grounds.
122 Ibid at para 61.
123 17 CBR (3d) 24 (Ont Sup Ct).
124 Ibid at para 5.
125 2003 CarswellOnt 6102, (Ont Sup Ct).
126 Re Smoky River Coal Ltd (1999), 175 D LR (4th)703 (AltaCA).
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interpretation.127 Similarly, in Oakwood Petroleums, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
stated that “a proper statutory construction of s. 11 of the C.C.A.A. is a wide one” and
defended the constitutional validity of “a wide reading of the provisions of the
C.C.A.A.”128129
The case law in Québec and the Atlantic provinces agrees with the above
statements. In ReNsC Diesel Power Inc,

one of the few CCAA cases in Atlantic

Canada, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court referred to the CCAA’s Depression-era origins
and its purpose of facilitating the reorganization of a debtor company so that it could
continue as a going concern. I30ln a 2009 decision, the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s
Bench stated that restructuring was “the principle on which the CCAA is founded,” going
on to explain that restructuring could reorder the value of insolvent corporations “in a
manner more coherent with public interest than that which might be available in
bankruptcy.”131
In Steinberg Inc v Michaud,132 the Québec Court of Appeal stated that “today
there is unanimous recognition of the statute’s raison d’être”, citing Chef Ready Foods:
The purpose o f the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the making o f a compromise or arrangement
between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able
to continue in business...

In the same judgment, the Québec court also relied on the Ontario Court of Appeal’s
statement on the purpose of the CCAA in Elan Corp. v. Comiskey133 and the Alberta
decision of Oakwood Petroleums. More recently, in the 2005 decision Re MEI Computer

127 Ibid at paras 31 and 51.
128 Norcen Energy Resources Ltd v Oakwood Petroleums Ltd (1988), 72 CBR (NS) 1 (Alta QB). For a
more recent statement, see Re 843504 Alberta L td (2003), 4 CBR (5th) 306 at para 13.
129 (1990), 79 CBR (NS) 1 (NS Sup Ct).
130 Ibid at para 9:
131 Re Long Potato Growers Ltd, 2009 NBQB 349 at para 29.
132 (1993), 55 QAC 298.
133 Elan Corp v Comiskey (1990), 1 CBR (3d) 101 (Ont CA).
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Technology Group Inc, 134the Québec Superior Court stated that “Québec courts share the
same vision as to the liberal interpretation of the CCAA” as courts in other provinces,
agreeing that the CCAA should be given a “large and liberal interpretation.”135
Taken together, these decisions demonstrate that there is strong agreement among
the different courts of the provinces as to the general nature and purpose of the CCAA.
There is also general agreement as to the wide scope of the court’s discretion in CCAA
proceedings, and the liberal interpretation that the court must apply to the Act’s
provisions. Broadly speaking, the CCAA is remedial legislation with the objective of
facilitating the reorganization of insolvent companies so as to avoid the negative
economic and social consequences of liquidation.

However, while there is general

agreement on this purpose, some recent decisions point to different judicial approaches to
the Act.

These divergences raise the question of whether it is appropriate to effect

liquidations under the CCAA.
(iv) “Liquidating CCAAs”
(a) A Divergence in Judicial Interpretation
A great deal has been said in recent scholarship on the trend of “liquidating
CCAAs” - the use of the CCAA regime to effect the eventual liquidation of the debtor
company on a going concern basis, as opposed to a reorganization.136 More will be said
on this problem in Chapter V. However, this section will offer a brief outline of the
problem as it relates to conflicting judicial interpretations of the CCAA.

134 [2005] RJQ 1558.
135 Ibid.
136 For critiques o f this trend, see Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs - Are We Praying to False
Gods?” [2008] Annual Rev Insol L 42; Bill Kaplan, “Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?” [2008]
Ann Rev Insol L 79.
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As discussed above, courts have traditionally understood the CCAA as a
mechanism for ensuring the survival of an insolvent company as a going concern, where
the needs of the company’s creditors and the public interest would be better served than
in a liquidation. Furthermore, it is implicit in this interpretation that liquidation typically
has negative social and economic consequences. As was discussed in Chapter I of this
thesis, the CCAA was enacted precisely to allow insolvent companies to survive and
avoid liquidation.

The Act was designed to complement the established bankruptcy

regime in which liquidation was the only option. It may seem strange, then, that recent
decisions in Ontario have approved liquidations under the CCAA, termed “liquidating
CCAAs.” This trend is prima facie in conflict with the more traditional judicial
approaches of courts in Alberta and British Columbia.
(b) Ontario Decisions
In Canadian Red Cross Society,137 Blair J., as he then was, approved a CCAA sale
of all of the blood supply assets and operations of the Red Cross in the face of roughly $8
billion of tort claims. Notably, this was done before a restructuring plan had been put to
the creditors for a vote. Likewise, in Re Consumers Packaging Inc,

the Ontario Court

of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s approval of a CCAA sale of substantially all of the
debtor company’s assets before a creditor vote. Along the same lines, in Re 1078385
Ontario Ltd (Bob-Lo Island),13718139 the Ontario Superior Court approved a plan of
arrangement in which all of the debtor company’s assets would be sold to the secured

137 Re Canadian Red Cross Society, [1998] OJ No 3306 (QL) (Ont Gen Div), leave to appeal refused.
138 (2001), 27 CBR (4th) 197 (Ont CA).
139 Re 1078385 Ontario Ltd (2004) 16 CBR (4th) 144 (Ont Sup Ct); leave to appeal refused, [2004] OJ No
6050 (QL) (Ont CA).
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creditors who had proposed the plan, with no proceeds remaining for the unsecured
creditors. In his decision, Quinn J. noted that plan was:140
...a shortcut in the realization o f the assets without satisfactory evidence o f value and
safeguards with regard to proof o f the debt. To a certain extent, that is true, but I think
that is the nature o f the CCAA. We have to balance moving this procedure forward in a
much quicker fashion than if we proceeded under a bankruptcy.

In allowing the secured creditors to use the CCAA as a collection tool, Bob
Lolsland effectively rejected the traditional approach to the CCAA as a statute designed
to facilitate the survival of the debtor company as a going concern.141
(c) Québec Decisions
The Ontario approach has not been adopted wholeheartedly in other provinces. In
a recent decision, the Québec Superior Court approved a plan to sell substantially all of
the debtor company’s assets where the plan was found to meet the CCAA’s broad
remedial purpose and allowed the company to carry out its business with the least harm
to its stakeholders.142143 However, in Re Mecachrome International Inc,m the Québec
Superior Court refused to approve a plan in which the DIP lenders were to acquire all of
the debtor company’s shares. The court stated that the aim of the CCAA was to enable
the debtor company to continue as a going concern for the benefit of its creditors and the
public interest. In the case, these aims had been frustrated by a lack of transparency and
the debtor company’s failure to canvass the market for other offers. As such, courts in
Québec historically have applied greater scrutiny to liquidating CCAAs.
(d) British Columbia and Alberta Decisions
140 Ibid at para 125.
141 For example, see Ground J.’s reasoning in obiter in Enterprise Capital Management Inc v Semi-Tech
Corp (1999), 10 CBR (4th) 133 (Ont Sup Ct) at 142-143, stating that it would be inappropriate to approve a
plan under the CCAA where the secured creditors were simply seeking to enforce their rights and liquidate
the company by means other than the trust indentures.
142 Re Railpower Technologies Corp, 2009 QCCS 2885 (Que Sup Ct).
143 [2009] RJQ 1302 (Que Sup Ct).
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Western courts generally have been skeptical of liquidating CCAAs, and some
have expressed concern with the Ontario approach. In Re Fracmaster,144 the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench refused to approve a sale plan in which the debtor company
would have sold substantially all of its assets. The court stated:145
It is generally accepted that the CCAA is not to be used to wind-up or liquidate a
company, although there are some circumstances in which the CCAA can be used in such
a way.

The court accepted that the CCAA could be used in a liquidation scenario in theory.
However, a liquidation plan had to be “workable or practical” in the sense that it was in
the creditors’ interests and that it attended to “economic reality.”146147Where there is no
added value to be gained for both the company and its stakeholders in a CCAA plan, then
the usual liquidation mechanisms in the bankruptcy regime should be used to wind-up the
insolvent company.
In Cliffs Over Maple Bay,141 the British Columbia Court of Appeal overturned a
lower court decision granting a section 11 stay of proceedings in favour of the debtor
company and authorizing DIP financing under the CCAA. The debtor company was a
single purpose developer of a golf course and residential development that had filed for
CCAA protection only after its secured creditors had appointed a receiver according to
the terms of their credit agreements. The Court of Appeal rejected the stay and DIP
financing requests on the grounds that there was no business to rescue, and went on to
register its skepticism of the Ontario approach:148
I need not decide the point on this appeal, but I query whether the court should grant a
stay under the CCAA to permit a sale, winding up or liquidation without requiring the

144 (1999), 11 CBR (4th) 204 (Alta QB); a ff d (1999), 11 CBR (4th) 230 (Alta CA).
145 Ibid at para 20.
146 Ibid at paras 24-25, 28 and 39.
147 Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd v Fisgard Capital Corp, 2008 BCCA 327.
148 Ibid, at para 32.
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matter to be voted upon by the creditors if the plan o f arrangement intended to be made
by the debtor company will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale, winding
up or liquidation be distributed to its creditors.

While this statement was obiter, it nonetheless questions the rule laid down in the Ontario
decisions of Re Consumers Packaging Inc.149and Canadian Red Cross Society,15015
discussed above.
(v) The Supreme Court of Canada
In the recent Century Services v. Canada (Attorney General)151case,the Supreme
Court of Canada interpreted the CCAA for the first time in over 75 years. In an 8-1
decision, the Court restored the order of a CCAA chambers judge denying the Crown’s
motion for payment of unremitted taxes by a company under CCAA protection. The
Supreme Court stated that Parliament had intended a “broad reading of CCAA authority”
and held that the lower court had “failed to...give the statute an appropriately purposive
and liberal interpretation.”152 This interpretation is consistent with the broad and liberal
approach to the CCAA endorsed by courts across the provinces.
Writing for the majority,153 Deschamps J. stated that a proper interpretation of the
CCAA’s provisions required an examination of “the history of the CCAA, its function
amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that
have been recognized in the jurisprudence.”154 Discussing the CCAA’s history,
Deschamps J. referred to the “battering visited upon Canadian businesses by the Great
Depression” that necessitated insolvency legislation allowing companies to avoid

149 (2001), 27 CBR (4th) 197 (Ont CA).
150 [1998] OJ 3306 (Ont Gen Div), leave to appeal refused.
151 2010 SCC 60.
152 Century Services v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at paras 68 and 73.
153 In separate but concurring reasons, Fish J. agreed with Deschamps J.’s analysis and the “important
historical and policy reasons” that she developed in support o f the decision. Ibid at para 94.
154 Ibid at para 11.
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liquidation by reorganizing.155 Deschamps J. went on to emphasize the remedial purpose
of the statute:156
Parliament understood when adopting the CCAA that liquidation o f an insolvent company
was harmful for most o f those it affected — notably creditors and employees — and that
a workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal.

The Supreme Court also emphasized the public interest purpose of the CCAA.
Citing Stanley Edwards’ article, Deschamps J. acknowledged that insolvency might
affect stakeholders beyond creditors and employees. In such cases, reorganization can
serve the public interest by facilitating the survival of insol vent companies, thus saving
jobs, goodwill, and allowing companies to continue supplying goods or services that are
crucial to the economy.157 Therefore, reorganization may be “justified in terms of
rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent
economic rel ationships in order to avoid negative consequences of liquidation.”158
Deschamps J. distinguished the CCAA from other Canadian insolvency
legislation for the “broad and flexible authority” that it granted to the supervising court in
making the “orders necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the
CCAA’s objectives.” 159 At the same time, Deschamps J. noted that since the CCAA
contains no provisions for failed reorganizations, the liquidation regime in the BIA
“necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a CCAA reorganization is
ultimately unsuccessful.” 160 This is a crucial difference between the BIA and CCAA, and
it bears directly on the question of whether wholesale liquidations should be permitted
under the CCAA as opposed to reorganizations. Although Deschamps J. did not consider
155 Ibid at para 16.
156 Ibid at para 17.
157 Ibid at para 18.
158 Ibid (emphasis added).
159 Ibid at para 19.
160 Ibid at para 23.
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this question, her later discussion of the scope and limits of the supervising judge’s
authority under the CCAA provides useful guidance:!6i
The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial
purpose o f the CCAA — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from
liquidation o f an insolvent company.

While this statement leaves open the possibility of liquidations under the CCAA, it
implies that these should be rare for several reasons. Firstly, the optimal outcome of
CCAA proceedings is the survival of the insolvent company.*162 Liquidation necessarily
precludes this optimal outcome. Secondly, the liquidation of an insolvent company is
often harmful to its stakeholders.163 For this reason, liquidation often runs counter to the
CCAA’s remedial purpose of avoiding social and economic losses. At a minimum, a
court that is asked to sanction a CCAA liquidation must determine whether the
liquidation will avoid the “social and economic losses resulting from liquidation” of the
insolvent company. Furthermore, the court should consider the practical effects of such
an order on. all the stakeholders, since “the chances for successful reorganizations are
enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as
advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.”164 Finally, liquidation typically
will occur after reorganization has failed, and it should follow the BIA regime.165 If a
proceeding is aimed only at liquidation, and the liquidation regime should be the same
under both statutes, then it would make more sense to begin that proceeding under the
BIA rather than the CCAA. These reasons will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter
V.

161

Ibid at para 70.
Ibid at para 17.
163
Ibid.
164
Ibid (emphasis added).
165
Ibid at 23.
162
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The Century Services decision is an important milestone in the evolution of the
CCAA for two reasons. Firstly, Century Services reiterates the basic legislative objective
of the CCA A as stated in Re CCAA, namely, to allow an insolvent company to reorganize
and thus avoid bankruptcy and the liquidation of its assets.166 Secondly, Century Services
represents a departure from Re CCAA by emphasizing the importance of the “public
interest” in reorganization. This is significant. Like Edwards, the Supreme Court in
Century Services recognized that the CCAA is more than, a legislative mechanism, for
facilitating compromises between debtors and creditors. This difference in interpretations
may be explained by the fact that Re CCAA was a constitutional reference. The Supreme
Court limited its analysis in the decision to the question of whether the CCAA was within
Parliament’s authority to enact. It did not interpret the provisions of the statute directly.
At the same time, the emphasis on the public interest in Century Services, a concept that
is never referenced in Re CCAA, is an acknowledgment that the CCAA has evolved since
it was enacted in 193 3.167 This evolution is consistent with Parliament’s original
objective of avoiding the negative social and economic consequences of liquidation.
(vi) Conclusion
This chapter has examined some of the key decisions in the history of the CCAA.
It has sought to provide a comprehensive account of the CCAA’s purposes by examining
the early cases and commentaries, recent decisions of the courts of the provinces, and the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Century Services.

This examination of the

166 Reference re Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, [1934] SCR 659 at para 17.
167 This evolution has been acknowledged in various commentaries on the CCAA. For example, Janis
Sarra notes that the CCAA’s provisions aim to facilitate arrangements between debtors and creditors, but
recent case law has emphasized the importance o f the public interest. Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the
Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations, (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 2003) at 4.
See also Roderick J Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) at 314.
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CCAA’s history and purpose provides the background for the chapters that follow. These
chapters discuss the CCAA’s place in Canada’s bankruptcy and insolvency regime, the
rules on asset sales under section 36, and the problem of liquidations under the statute.
A few points arise from the analysis in this chapter. Firstly, despite general
agreement as to the purposes and application of the CCAA, there is a divergence in
judicial interpretation on the issue of liquidating CCAAs. This divergence is particularly
evident in the Ontario and Western decisions discussed here.

The Century Services

decision has not resolved this problem because the decision does not specifically discuss
liquidating CCAAs. While Century Services implies that liquidating CCAAs should be
rare, the Supreme Court of Canada has left the question open for future argument. For
the same reason, section 36 of the CCAA, a new section on the court approval of asset
sales that was added in 2009, does not resolve the problem of liquidations. While section
36 grants courts the authority to sanction asset sales, it does not say exactly how courts
should exercise this authority.

For example, section 36 does not say whether it is

appropriate to sanction a proposed liquidation before a plan of arrangement is filed and
the creditors have voted in favour of the liquidation.168 This will be discussed further in
Chapter IV.
Secondly, the public interest is an important consideration in CCAA proceedings.
The recent Century Services case emphasizes the public interest aim of the CCAA and
represents a departure from the Supreme Court’s earlier, narrower reading in Re CCAA
that focused only on the debtor-creditor relationship. The role and meaning of the public
interest in the restructuring context will be discussed further in Chapter III.

168 Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs - Are We Praying to False Gods?” (2008) Annual Review

o f Insolvency Law 33 at 44-45.
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III. A THEORY OF RESTRUCTURING
(!) Introduction
The first two chapters of this thesis examined the history and purpose of the
CCAA. This chapter examines competing theories of restructuring in order to understand
the CCAA’s role in the broader context of Canada’s bankruptcy and insolvency system.
Many of the sources discussed in this chapter are American. Although the U.S.
literature does not address the CCAA or the Canadian bankruptcy system specifically, the
articles are still instructive because of their critique of the purposes and limits of
restructuring. Also, various researchers have demonstrated the usefulness of comparative
analyses of U.S. and Canadian reorganization law.1691702 Furthermore, U.S. bankruptcy
theory is now more relevant to Canadian law with the growing prevalence of CanadaU.S. cross-border insolvency proceedings.

i

nr\

#

These proceedings have imported aspects of

U.S. restructuring law into Canadian law, such as stalking horse auctions and DIP
financing, while the recent adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law

has led to greater

harmonization of bankruptcy and insolvency law in both countries. In particular, DIP
financing procedures have been codified in the new section 11.2 of the CCAA

as well

as section 50.6 of the BIA.173
This chapter begins by examining modem critiques of restructuring and its place
in a bankruptcy system. It proceeds with a consideration of the CCAA in light of these
169 For example, see Lynn M Lopucki and George G Triantis, “A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S.
and Canadian Reorganization o f Financially Distressed Companies” (1994) 35 Har Int’l LJ 267; Yaad
Rotem, “Contemplating a Corporate Governance Model for Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Lessons from
Canada” (2008) 3 Va L & Bus Rev 125.
170 For example, see Re AbitibiBowater Inc, 2010 QCCS 1742 (Que SC); Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009),
55 CBR (5th) 229 (Ont Sup Ct).
171 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, GA
Res 52/158, arts 25-27, UN Doc A/Res/52/158 (Jan 30, 1998).
172 Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36 s 11.2.
173 Bankruptcy and Insolvency j4cfRSGi985cB3s 50.6.
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critiques and suggests that serving the “public interest” - a broader constituency of
stakeholders than traditional creditors such as lending institutions - is an important
objective of restructuring law.
(ii) Why Restructure? Competing Theories of Restructuring and Its Usefulness
(a) The “Going Concern Value” Premise
A common justification for restructuring is that it maximizes value for creditors.
The premise is that a debtor company is worth much more as a going concern than what
would be obtained through a piecemeal liquidation of the debtor’s assets in
bankruptcy.174 By preserving the status quo and allowing the debtor time to reorganize
its business and negotiate new financing arrangements, restructuring avoids “fire sale”
scenarios and maximizes value for the company’s creditors.175

However, some

commentators have suggested that a bankruptcy or receivership liquidation may be
preferable to restructuring, since it is still possible in these cases to liquidate a debtor’s
assets on a going concern basis without the additional costs of a restructuring.176 Many
reasons are given why restructuring might be preferable to the bankruptcy or receivership
options: for instance, there may be few potential buyers for the debtor’s business,
requiring a more flexible sale process that is only possible in restructuring; it may be
impossible to sell the business as a going concern where some creditors have security
interests on key assets; and bankruptcy may not stay some creditors from enforcing their
security interests. Additionally, some argue that restructuring generally affords more
time for the debtor to prepare a reorganization or sale plan, and takes advantage of the
174 Roderick J Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) at 313.
175 For example, see Stanley E Edwards, “Reorganizations Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement
Act” (1947) 25 Can Bar Rev 587, in which the author argues that the CCAA is intended, among other
things, to avoid “improvident sales” o f a debtor company’s assets.
176 Roderick J Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) at 313. These additional
costs would include, for example, negotiations between creditors and the debtor company.
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specific experience and knowledge of the debtor company’s management.

177

The debtor

company’s management would not remain in place in a bankruptcy or receivership.17178
According to the “going concern value” account, restructuring is important
because it prevents creditors from seizing a debtor company’s assets whenever the
company encounters financial difficulty, potentially destroying value.

Calling this

account the “Debtor in Control narrative”, David Skeel explains:179
According to this narrative, bankruptcy is designed to preserve “going concern value”
when a large company stumbles. To achieve this objective, bankruptcy prevents creditors
from making grabs for the company’s assets, and it gives the debtor’s management an
opportunity to negotiate with its creditors over the terms o f a reorganization plan.

[...]
The Debtor in Control narrative suggested that the company and its team o f professionals
should be given plenty o f time to determine what went wrong and work with its creditors
to develop a plan for a healthier future. The narrative included an appeal to patience and
for sympathy for the distressed company.

Skeel suggests that the Debtor in Control paradigm has since been supplanted by a new
opposing narrative, which he calls “No Time to Spare”, which emphasizes immediate
court approval of a new financing arrangement and the sale of the distressed company’s
assets “because the company’s assets are a melting ice cube and will. . . evaporate unless
the court springs immediately into action.”180
Both the Debtor in Control and No Time to Spare paradigms assume that
restructuring is preferable to bankruptcy because it preserves the going concern value of
the debtor’s assets. This is not a new idea. While Skeel suggests that the Debtor in

177 Ibid. This may be a double-edge sword: as skilled as incumbent management may otherwise be, they
may still be implicit in the company’s insolvency. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether incumbent
management is in the best position to steer the company back to profitability.
178 Although historically a receiver did not necessarily have power o f management, most court-appointed
receivers now are receiver-managers. See Roderick J Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2009) at 458.
179 David A Skeel, Jr, “Competing Narratives In Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor In Control vs. No Time To
Spare” (2009) Mich St L Rev 1187 at 1198.
180 Ibid at 1199.
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Control and No Time to Spare paradigms emerged in the 1980s and 1990s,
respectively,181 Stanley Edwards argued as early as 1947 in the Canadian context that
restructuring is preferable to bankruptcy because it preserves going concern value.182 In
other words, the idea - central to both of the narratives that Skeel discusses - that
restructuring preserves going concern value and is therefore preferable to a liquidation in
bankruptcy, has been prominent in restructuring theory since restructuring laws were first
enacted. More recently, this premise has come under attack from a variety of theorists
with differing views of restructuring. These criticisms, in turn, have led to responses
from proponents of restructuring who have argued that restructuring is worthwhile even
when it does not maximize value for creditors, narrowly defined.

Rather, these

proponents argue that the legitimate goals of restructuring include the rehabilitation of the
debtor company for the benefit of a broader constituency of stakeholders.

These

stakeholders may include employees, suppliers, and communities that are dependant, to
varying degrees, on the debtor company. These opposing views are discussed below.
(b) Debt Collection Theory and Restructuring’s Skeptics
Debt collection theory holds that the bankruptcy process should aim primarily to
resolve creditors’ collection problems in order to maximize returns.

This view

emphasizes the historical aim of bankruptcy law of providing creditors with a compulsory
and collective forum to sort out their claims.183 In other words, bankruptcy law resolves
the collective action problem that arises when a debtor defaults on debts to multiple

1811bid
182 Stanley E Edwards, “Reorganizations Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act” (1947) Can
Bar Rev 587.
183 Thomas H Jackson, The Logic and Limits o f Bankruptcy Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1986) at 2. Jackson notes that bankruptcy law also has as its goal the rehabilitation o f the
bankrupt —giving the bankrupt a “fresh start” - though this was not historically regarded as a legitimate
aim alongside debt collection. See below.
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creditors. In the absence of the bankruptcy process, the creditors would scramble to seize
the debtor’s assets, leading to the collapse of the debtor’s business as a going concern,
and leaving most creditors and the shareholders worse off.184 Bankruptcy law forces the
creditors to work collectively on the assumption that they are better off acting as a group.
By facilitating this “creditors’ bargain”, the bankruptcy system does its best to enforce
entitlements that existed prior to bankruptcy.185
Notably, while some debt collection theorists have acknowledged that the
rehabilitation of the debtor is also a legitimate aim of bankruptcy law,186187it is a mistake to
assume that rehabilitation in itself was an objective of bankruptcy law before the modem
era. As Emily Kadens’ research shows, a bankrupt’s refusal to cooperate in repaying
creditors was a capital offence in 18th century England, and the possibility of a discharge
was introduced only to incentivize the bankrupt’s cooperation -

not because

rehabilitation and a “fresh start” for the debtor were thought to be worthy goals in
1 0*7

themselves.

Moreover, this historical concept of rehabilitation was connected to the

individual debtor, not the corporation. This fact may be a problem for debt collection
theorists who wish to acknowledge the legitimacy of the rehabilitative goal of modem
bankruptcy law, particularly with respect to corporations. Rehabilitation as a goal in
itself, and the notion of sympathy for the debtor, are relatively new concepts that are not
always consistent with the goal of maximizing returns for creditors. Also, the concept of
rehabilitation and sympathy for the individual is quite different from the concept of

m Ibid at 10-19.
185 See Thomas H Jackson, “Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain” (1982)
91 Yale L J 857 at 871: “[Bjankruptcy law should make a fundamental decision to honor negotiated non
bankruptcy entitlements.”
186 Ibid at 2.
187 Emily Kadens, “The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in the Development o f Bankruptcy
Law” (2009-2010) 59 Duke LJ 1229.
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rehabilitation of the corporation. The latter is an even newer idea in the history of
bankruptcy law.
Debt collection theory does not necessarily preclude restructuring.

Where a

business is worth more as a going concern than what would be achieved in a piecemeal
liquidation, it follows that the creditors stand more to gain from its survival. However,
some debt collection theorists have argued that liquidation in bankruptcy is often
preferable to restructuring. For example, Baird and Rasmussen have argued that the
assets of an insolvent company will not always hold greater going concern value than
what would be realized through a piecemeal liquidation:188
In short, many assets work equally as well in one firm as another. Other assets that are
tailored to a specific firm may not represent a source o f value but the source o f failure.
Our point here is a cautionary one. One can point to neither the size o f a firm alone nor
the existence o f firm-specific assets to conclude that corporation reorganization law has
an important role to play in our modem economy.

This argument directly challenges the account that restructuring is preferable to
piecemeal liquidation because it preserves going concern value.

For example, in a

traditional account of the purposes of restructuring, Stanley Edwards explained:189
It may be that the main value o f the assets o f a company is derived from their being fitted
together into one system and that individually they are worth little.
The trade
connections associated with the system and held by the management may also be
valuable. In the case o f a large company it is probable that no buyer can be found who
would be willing to buy the enterprise as a whole and pay its going concern value. The
alternative to reorganization then is often a sale o f the property piecemeal for an amount
which would yield little satisfaction to the creditors and none at all to the shareholders.

On Edwards’ account, the function of the CCAA - Canada’s restructuring statute - was
to “keep a company going despite insolvency”, that is, to protect the debtor company

188 Douglas G Baird and Robert K Rasmussen, “The End o f Bankruptcy” (2002-2003) 55 Stan L Rev at
768.
189 Stanley E Edwards, “Reorganizations Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act” (1947) Can
Bar Rev 587 at 592.
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from bankruptcy so that it could reorganize its business to the advantage of its
stakeholders.190
Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen have suggested that financial innovations
and the changing nature of firms have led to a “new world of corporate reorganizations”
in which restructuring often results in less optimal outcomes than bankruptcy.191192 For
example, they argue that because some modem firms have “hundreds or thousands of
subsidiaries, there is no easy way to sort out the rights of creditors, even though they are
all nominally general creditors.”

The result is that restructuring law can no longer

resolve the collective action problems that arise among creditors with many similar
claims.

Instead, these creditors’ interests are so fragmented that it is difficult or

impossible for them to agree on a restructuring plan in such cases.193
New types of financial instruments such as credit default swaps compound the
problem of fragmented creditor interests. The holders of these and other derivatives,
while nominally creditors, will rarely have interests similar to those of other general
creditors of a company because they are only concerned with their returns with respect to
a “credit event” - i.e. an event that triggers bankruptcy - without regard to any other
aspect of the debtor company’s situation.194 Moreover, new entities like hedge funds
have now become important lenders, but hedge funds operate much differently than
traditional lenders like banks because they often have a short life, do not provide the

190 Ibid.
191 Douglas G Baird and Robert K Rasmussen, “Antibankruptcy” (2010) 119 Yale LJ 648 at 652.
192 Ibid at 658.
193 Ibid at 657.
194 Ibid at 680.
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services of banks, and are not subject to the same reputational constraints. As Baird and
Rasmussen explain:195
Banks make their profit by lending and having it paid back. They do not seek to own and
operate the business. Not so with hedge funds. A hedge fund may buy the loan with the
view that in the event o f default it would be left with the business, and given the amount
at which it purchased the notes, it would not be a bad price at which to acquire it even if
it were in financial distress. Banks want their money back; hedge funds loan to own.
The same dynamic that plays out with respect to publicly traded unsecured debt now
plays out with respect to traditional bank debt as well.

According to this argument, the result of new instruments like credit swaps and new
players like hedge funds is that creditor interests are highly fragmented, such that
restructuring will be inefficient or even impossible because a debtor company’s creditors
will not fall into a few diverse but similarly situated groups.
Following Baird and Rasmussen, Jassmine Girgis has suggested that the nature of
the modem firm has changed such that corporate reorganizations may no longer be value
enhancing. This argument emphasizes the new value that firms hold beyond fixed, firmspecific assets:196
When the process o f corporate reorganization arose, it did so because the firm elements
were firm-specific - they would retain the most value by remaining in the particular firm.
There was therefore incentive to keep the firm operating as a going concern. But over the
last century, the elements o f a firm have been changing. The physical elements have
become less firm-specific. Firms have moved away from large manufacturing entities
and are now more oriented toward providing service and data. This means that the value
o f networks, the knowledge, the relationships may have surpassed the value o f the
physical assets.

On this account, in the past, it made sense to preserve firms whose assets were primarily
fixed and firm-specific because these assets could not be liquidated easily at full value.
However, since many modem firms are no longer large manufacturers that rely on fixed,
firm-specific assets, restructuring may not serve any purpose because these assets are
easily liquidated at full value, and therefore the need to preserve the firm has been lost.
195 Ibid at 670.
196 Jassmine Girgis, “Corporate Reorganization and the Economic Theory o f the Firm” [2011] Ann Rev o f
Insol L 467 at 491.
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Notably, even if we grant that restructuring may no longer enhance value for
many firms because they are service providers rather than manufacturers, restructuring
remains important and potentially value enhancing for at least two reasons. Firstly,
manufacturers still comprise a major sector of the Canadian economy. It is helpful to
compare manufacturers with professional services firms.

Professional services firms

seem to exemplify the new types of firms that Girgis discusses: they rely mainly on
human capital and they possess far greater value in their networks, knowledge and
relationships than their fixed assets. Manufacturers continue to represent a significantly
larger portion of Canadian GDP than professional services firms.

This suggests that

restructuring remains potentially quite important for a large sector of the Canadian
economy even if the changing nature of firms has rendered restructuring irrelevant for
some. Secondly, as Girgis suggests, restructuring could remain relevant even for firms
whose assets are mainly expertise and relationships because these assets might be firmspecific. For example, some aspects of human capital may be lost when transferring from
one firm to another because “there is general know-how, not necessarily attached to
particular individuals, locked up in the firm itself.”197198 Such know-how might include the
knowledge of firm contacts or the strengths and weaknesses of colleagues.

This

“organizational capital” resides in the firm, making it difficult to transfer “unless the
entire network can be transferred to another firm.”199

197 Despite a decrease for the sector since 2001, manufacturing was $151 billion o f Canadian GDP in 2009,
compared to $60.6 billion for professional services. Also, manufacturing represented $362.5 billion in
accumulated capital investments in 2009, compared to $26 billion for professional services. See Canadian
Industry Statistics (CIS), Industry Canada, online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cis-sic.nsf/eng/Home>.
198 Jassmine Girgis, “Corporate Reorganization and the Economic Theory o f the Firm” [2011] Ann Rev of
Insol L 467 at 481.
199 Ibid.
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In evaluating the argument that corporate restructuring has become inefficient or
ineffective due to the modern nature of firms and financial innovation, it is useful to
consider the history of restructuring. David Skeel points out that early restructuring was
not always a clean and organized process in which a diverse group of creditors found
common ground through negotiation:200201
This overview is quite sanitized, o f course. Sometimes the railroad and its banks were at
loggerheads, or the court would refuse to appoint an interim receiver. Sometimes, an
outsider would set up its own committee and try to wrest control o f the process away
from the debtor’s principal investment banks. There were corporate raiders in the early
twentieth century, just as there are now.

In other words, corporate restructuring historically involved complex arrangements
between firms and their creditors, as well as creditors possessing what Baird and
Rasmussen would call fragmented interests. Significantly, this fragmentation did not
hinder many past restructurings or precipitate the demise of restructuring law. Therefore,
the mere fact of further complexity and fragmentation in modem cases does not
necessarily spell the demise of corporate restructuring as an effective tool for preserving
value.

Restructuring has never been simple and straightforward.

As Baird and

Rasmussen themselves conclude, the problem of the “empty core” - that is, the absence
of a stable equilibrium of interests that allows creditors to reach consensus - might well
be resolved by the supervising judge in the restructuring process, who can interpret the
law so as to promote consensus.

901

At the same time, while many firms now focus on services and data and hold
considerable intangible assets, many other firms still hold fixed assets as well.
Presumably, on Girgis’s account, corporations holding fixed assets would still benefit

200 David A Skeel, Jr, “Competing Narratives In Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor In Control vs. No Time To
Spare” (2009) Mich St L Rev 1187 at 1191.
201 Douglas G Baird and Robert K Rasmussen, “Antibankruptcy” (2010) 119 Yale LJ 648 at 699.
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from restructuring. Examples of large firms that have undergone restructuring recently
include GM, Chrysler, and AbitibiBowater - manufacturers with mostly fixed assets in
the form of property and equipment. Moreover, the emergence of firms focused on data
or services is not entirely new. Large professional services firms have existed for some
time, but the number of filings in recent years shows that there remains strong demand
for restructuring law as a mechanism for redeploying the assets of many different sorts of
firms, at least so long as those firms have considerable fixed assets.
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(c) Market Theory
Market theorists hold that restructuring’s main purpose should be the efficient
operation of the markets.

In practical terms, this means that market forces, not the

government, should decide whether a company ought to be liquidated or restructured, and
how to maximize returns for creditors.

Proponents of this account argue that

restructuring is unnecessary to preserve an insolvent firm’s value since creditors could
make private agreements before insolvency that would preserve such value through
collective remedies. In such cases, restructuring would only be justified where it is more
efficient than the alternatives available in private law, namely new types of contracts
amongst creditors and debtors.202203
Pure market theory has been criticized for failing to recognize that the state has
already intervened in many ways to regulate the economy, whether through securities
202 Again, recent examples such as GM, Chrysler, and Abitibi are pertinent. Nortel also had considerable
fixed assets in the form o f equipment that were sold through the restructuring process. Many more
examples could be added, such as: Calpine, a major energy company whose restructuring was one o f the
largest in Canadian history; Stelco, now part o f U.S. Steel; and Cadillac Fairview, which owns extensive
commercial real estate developments across Canada.
203 Barry Adler, “Financial and Political Theories o f American Corporate Bankruptcy” (1992-1993) 45 Stan
L Rev 311. Adler proposes a new form o f arrangement known as “chameleon equity”, in which a firm
could issue a set o f fixed obligations whose holders would be entitled to interest payments but not to collect
individually on an obligation in default. This would avoid inefficiencies such as individual creditors
forcing the premature liquidation o f the debtor. Ibid, at 323-324.
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regulators or corporate legislation. Moreover, the outcomes of restructuring are often
influenced not only by the market, but by legal and political factors as well.204205
Consequently, it is a mistake to assume that market forces will operate freely in the
absence of restructuring legislation.

Rather, other factors such as government and

regulators’ decisions will continue to affect market forces, with perhaps less than ideal
results from the perspective of pure market theory. As such, for their basic argument to
succeed, market theorists must prove that restructuring renders the current imperfect
system less efficient than it otherwise would be. This is an additional burden to proving
the basic point that restructuring is less efficient from the point of view of an ideal free
market.
(d) Loss Distribution and Rehabilitation Theory
According to the “loss distribution theory”, bankruptcy law is more than a system
for resolving the debt collection problems of traditional creditors.

Rather, the

bankruptcy process should also consider the many different interests affected by
corporate failure - including those of customers, employees, and communities - often
collectively termed the “public interest” and recognized by Canadian courts in CCAA
proceedings.206 On this account, the bankruptcy process should sort out the entitlements
of this broader group of creditors as well. In varying degrees, this account has informed
the historically dominant approaches to restructuring in many modem countries,
including Canada and the United States. However, the precise meaning of the term
204 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (Toronto:
University o f Toronto Press, 2003) at 36.
205 For example, see Elizabeth Warren, “Bankruptcy Policy” (1987) U Chi L Rev 775; “Bankruptcy Policy
Making in an Imperfect World” (1993) 92 Mich Law Rev 336.
206 Stanley E Edwards, “Reorganizations Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act”, (1947) 25
Can Bar Rev 587 at 593. For judicial recognition o f the public interest aim o f the CCAA, see: Re Metcalfe
& Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp, 2008 ONCA 587 at paras 51-52, 61; Century Services v
Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at paras 16-18, 60.
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“public interest”, and the extent to which it should be given priority over the interests of
traditional creditors in a restructuring, remains unclear.
Janis Sarra has argued that maximizing value for a narrowly defined group of
creditors - in practical terms, senior secured lenders are often the only creditors to realize
returns in a liquidation in bankruptcy - is just one of the many goals of corporate
reorganization:207208
Market and debt collection theories are limited in their analysis because their definition
o f interest recognizes only equity and debt capital investment in the firm. They ignore
the other investments that contribute value and which may be vitally important to
decision making in terms o f wealth maximization.

Similarly, Donald Korobkin argues that reorganization law reflects the fact that a
corporation engages much broader interests than those of lenders.

In his view, a

corporation is not merely “a lifeless pool of assets,” but has the potential to be a moral,
political and social actor:
The law o f corporate reorganization developed as a corrective to a bankruptcy
jurisprudence that would have ignored a financially distressed corporation’s dynamic
potential. It reflected a means o f bringing the corporation’s dynamic personality into
public view and regulating not merely its economic divisions, but the playing out o f its
moral, political and social views.

Like other rehabilitation theories, this view holds that courts should be given broad
discretion in recognizing the broader interests at play in bankruptcy.209210 However,
Korobkin departs from traditional rehabilitation theory in emphasizing a “value-based”
account of bankruptcy law that directly challenges the economic account espoused by
Jackson, Baird and others:

910

The economic account has misidentified the distinct function o f bankruptcy law because,
fundamentally, it has tracked the wrong problem from the start. The economic account
207 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (Toronto:
University o f Toronto Press, 2003) at 41.
208 Donald R Korobkin, “Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence o f Bankruptcy” (1991) 91 Colum L Rev
717 at 745.
209 Ibid at 774-775.
210 Ibid at 762.
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views bankruptcy law as a response to the economic problem o f collecting debt. In
contrast, the value-based account is founded on a deeper understanding o f the concern to
which bankruptcy law is addressed. Bankruptcy law is a response to the problem o f
financial distress-not only as an economic, but as a moral, political, personal, and social
problem that affects its participants.

In Korobkin’s view, a corporation develops a moral and political character through “the
choices of the parties who participate in its decisions.”211 Over time, these participants
define and redefine not only the economic aims of the corporation, but also its social,
political and moral aims. As such, the fundamental question in bankruptcy is not what to
do with the assets of the corporation, but what the corporation should exist to do.
Bankruptcy law is distinct because no other system responds to the problem of financial
distress in this way.212213Thus, as a normative account, the value-based approach answers
the challenge of economic-based theorists to explain why some entitlements ought to
change in bankruptcy. Another significant departure of the value-based account from
other rehabilitation theories is that it does not focus on the survival of the distressed
corporation itself. Instead, the value-based account favors any process - reorganization
or liquidation - that results in the “rehabilitation of the values of its participants.”

That

is, rehabilitation is deemed successful when it corrects the problems of those affected by
the financial distress of the corporation.
James Bowers has criticized the value-based account on the grounds that
bankruptcy law is primarily concerned with economic phenomena such as “lending,
borrowing, financial losses, stocks, bonds, contracts, payments, and security interests.”214
Moreover, the fact that bankruptcy legislation contains redistributive provisions does not,

211 Ibid at 770.
212 Ibid at 766.
213 Ibid at 774.
214 James W Bowers, “Whither What Hits the Fan? Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary
Economics o f Loss Distribution” (1991-1992) 26 Ga L Rev 27 at 69.
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in itself, mean that economic theory cannot contribute meaningfully to a dialogue about
those provisions by raising important normative questions. In short, Bowers suggests that
the value-based account does not sufficiently justify the inclusion of non-economic
interests in the bankruptcy process - it merely points to the fact that some of these
interests are included in the present legislation.

j i c

One might reject Korobkin’s value-based account, as Bowers does, on the
grounds that bankruptcy law is primarily concerned with economic questions such as how
to divide up the pie amongst creditors. However, this does not rule out an economic
account of bankruptcy law that considers a broader set of interests than those of
traditional creditors such as lenders. As Bowers notes, economics is concerned with
“goods” in the broadest sense, and therefore “there are few, if any, noneconomic
values.”215216 As such, Bowers’ objection does not rule out the sort of bankruptcy system
proposed by Karen Gross. Like Korobkin, Gross has argued that a bankruptcy system
should account for “community interests”, which may be as varied as the preservation of
jobs to the quality of life in a town. On this account, even where community interests are
not strictly quantifiable, they may still have value and should therefore be considered in
the bankruptcy process.217 Like the value-based account, Gross’ approach emphasizes the
protection of interests that are not necessarily quantifiable. However, Gross also insists
that such a system need not ignore the interests of creditors or make noneconomic
choices over economic ones.

215 Ibid at 71.
216 Ibid at 72.
217 Ibid at 1046.

Instead, Gross advocates a broader understanding of
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economic interests: 218
•

•

Taking community interests seriously is not synonymous with rejecting all economic
modeling; what it reflects is a desire for a different, more expansive economic model.
Such a model would account for (value) things not currently considered by the narrow
economic paradigm. Finally, considering community does not mean that we should
always save the buggy whip maker, the euphemism used at the Conference and elsewhere
for the company whose need to exist has apparently obsolesced....

This broader definition of economic interests is attractive because it recognizes that
restructuring often engages matters of “public interest”. However, the concept of the
community or public interest is unclear. Additionally, Gross’ account does not say how
the public interest ought to be weighed against the more narrow economic interests of
debtors and creditors.
One solution to the above problem is to accept that bankruptcy law is predicated
on economics - broadly defined - without abandoning its redistributive aim. Elizabeth
Warren proposes such a system:

91Q

Even i f it does not compel specific answers to hard questions, identifying the premise o f
bankruptcy has a very real impact on how those questions are answered. If the central
justification is nothing more than a single economic construct, specific conclusions with
systemwide impact follow neatly from an abstract principle. But if the justification for
bankruptcy is also distributional, the relevant inquiry is necessarily larger: what are the
values to be protected in the distributional scheme, and is the implementation scheme
effective?

In Warren’s view, bankruptcy law’s distributional aims require a consideration of broad
normative questions about who suffers when a business fails, as well as who can best
bear the costs of failure. These are difficult questions without neat answers. However,
Warren sees this approach as preferable to Baird’s because it leaves open the possibility
that bankruptcy can balance the interests of the debtor, traditional creditors and others
“who may be injured by the debtor’s collapse.”21829220 In short, Warren acknowledges that

218 Karen Gross, “Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay” (1994) 72 Wash U
L Q 1031 at 1033.
219 Elizabeth Warren, “Bankruptcy Policy” (1987) 54 U Chi L Rev 775 at 796.
220 Ibid at 799.
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one aim of bankruptcy is to provide a collective process for debt collection, but asserts
that it is not the only measure for justifying the entire bankruptcy system.2212 Indeed, if
promoting collectivism were the only aim of bankruptcy, then we should favor a system
in which creditor classes are abolished. All creditors would decide collectively whether
to sell or keep the collateral depending on which brings more money, and since all
creditors would be equal, they would focus only on maximizing the value of the whole
estate. Ultimately, this pure collectivist model would be undesirable because it would
significantly alter the behaviour of different parties outside the bankruptcy process,
impose costs in other areas of the credit system, and pose a serious threat to that
system. 222
Although restructuring theory remains unsettled, Warren’s account offers the best
compromise between a purely collectivist model that ignores the social and economic
consequences of restructuring for non-traditional creditor groups, and a value-based
model that ignores the fact that restructuring law still begins with the debtor-creditor
relationship.

Warren’s account recognizes that restructuring law is concerned with

economic phenomena such as financing and security, but may also consider broader
interests.

This account also seems broadly consistent with Janis Sarra’s model of

restructuring under the CCAA, which is discussed further below.223 However, if
restructuring law ought to consider interests beyond those of traditional creditor groups
such as lenders, then it is essential to have some definition of what those broader interests
might be. Therefore, it is helpful to consider how the concept of the public interest has

221 Ibid at 800.
222 Ibid at 804.
223 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations, (Toronto:
University o f Toronto Press, 2003) at 41.
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developed in Canadian restructuring law.
(in) Defining the “Public Interest”
In addition to the separate objective of preserving going concern value, Canadian
restructuring law aims to serve the public interest as well. This purpose can be traced
back to the CCAA’s historical roots. Discussing the CCAA in 1947, Stanley Edwards
stated:22425
Another reason which is usually operative in favour o f reorganization is the interest o f the
public in the continuation o f the enterprise, particularly if the company supplies
commodities or services that are necessary or desirable to large numbers o f consumers, or
if it employs large numbers o f workers who would be thrown out o f employment by its
liquidation. This public interest may be reflected in the decisions o f the creditors and
shareholders o f the company and is undoubtedly a factor a court would wish to consider
in deciding whether to sanction an arrangement under the C. C. A. A.

Edwards understands the term “public interest” to include the interests of consumers,
investors, labor groups and the general public in the reorganization process.
The Supreme Court of Canada recognized the importance of considering the
public interest in a restructuring in Century Services v. Canada.

Acknowledging the

historical roots of the CCAA in the Great Depression, the Supreme Court went on to
discuss early cases and commentaries on the Act:226
Early commentary and jurisprudence also endorsed the CCAA’s remedial objectives. . .
Reorganization serves the public interest by facilitating the survival o f companies
supplying goods or services crucial to the health o f the economy or saving large numbers
o f jobs. Insolvency could be so widely felt as to impact stakeholders other than creditors
and employees. Variants o f these views resonate today, with reorganization justified in
terms o f rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web o f
interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences o f
liquidation.

Later in its decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that courts must be aware of the
interests in restructuring beyond those of debtors and creditors. These might include the

224 Stanley E Edwards, “Reorganizations Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act” (1947) 25
Can Bar Rev 587 at 593.
225 Century Services v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60.
226 Ibid at para 18.
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interests of employees, directors, shareholders, and those doing business with the
insolvent company.227289 Additionally, there will be cases in which the “broader public
interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against
which the decision to allow a particular action will be weighed.”
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the public interest in Century Services
repeatedly cites Janis Sarra’s work Creditor Rights and the Public Interest.

In her

work, Sarra considers the question of how to reconcile the interests of debtors and
creditors with the public interest.

Sarra acknowledges that the public interest is “a

nebulous and troublesome concept.”230231 However, Sarra suggests that while most judicial
decisions in the insolvency context avoid defining the public interest, the term refers to
the complex balancing of interests that courts undertake in restructuring. This balancing
of interests has given rise to several principles for which the term “public interest” is a
short form reference. Sarra summarizes these principles as follows:
•

It is in the public interest to:

•

avoid premature liquidations - restructuring schemes are a valuable mechanism to
prevent them;

•

achieve the optimal allocation of costs of firm failure, internally and externally;

•

protect the claims of various stakeholders such that there is not a race to enforce
individual claims to the detriment of other claimants;

•

respect the statutory allocation of priority claims while still allowing parties the

227 Ibid at para 60.
228 Ibid. Emphasis added.
229 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (Toronto:
University o f Toronto Press, 2003).
230 Ibid at 106.
231 Ibid.
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opportunity to determine whether they should compromise or defer those claims
in anticipation of generating greater value in the long term;
•

enhance access to information about the insolvent firm in order to allow for
informed negotiations for an optimal solution;

•

generate economic activity and to create a going-forward business strategy that
preserves creditors’, workers’, and other firm-specific economic investments.

In addition to the non-traditional creditor groups mentioned above, such as workers, we
may also wish to include pensioners.232 Significantly, these public interest principles are
grounded firmly in measurable economic interests and include the collectivist aim of
avoiding the creditors’ race to seize the debtor’s assets.

At the same time, these

principles depart from the collectivist account by recognizing that groups beyond
traditional creditors make investments in firms and therefore have quantifiable interests
in a restructuring. These groups - such as employees and pensioners for example - may
be involuntary creditors who lack the leverage or standing of large institutional lenders
and cannot negotiate for better protection of their interests in the event of bankruptcy.
Clearly, such an approach will have distributional consequences, and this will upset those
who wish to protect negotiated pre-bankruptcy entitlements. However, Sarra notes that
there are also distributional consequences to a system that “values equity and debt capital
to the exclusion of other investments.”233 The key to Sarra’s account is that any
distributive consequences should be based on quantifiable investments in “human capital,

232 Sarra notes in a recent study that unfunded pension liabilities “have been the driver o f a significant
number o f recent CCAA filings.” Janis Sarra, “Development o f a Model to Track Filings and Collect Data
for Proceedings Under the CCAA”, Final Report to the Office o f the Superintendent o f Bankruptcy Canada
(March 2006), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01669.html>. Also, the recent case
o f Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 has highlighted the importance o f pensioners’ rights in the
restructuring context.
233 Ibid at 107.
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environmental waiver, capital investment and infrastructure.”

Sarra’s approach allows for consideration of a broader range of interests in
restructuring than the collectivist account. At the same time, her approach does not go so
far as to reject the underlying economic-based model for decision-making in the
insolvency context. Adhering to the economic-based model - and thus insisting that the
“public interest” include only quantifiable investments - provides an important balance
for courts in deciding when to favor some interests over others.

Any approach

advocating consideration of broader interests in restructuring must answer the question of
where to draw the line. If restructuring is not all about debtors and creditors, then how do
we decide who else should be included, and how do we decide when one interest should
prevail over another? Focusing on quantifiable economic investments, broadly defined,
is one answer to this problem. In fact, this is not a new idea. It is consistent with the
principles of the CCAA and is evident in the early commentaries on the Act. Stanley
Edwards emphasized that in making a decision, a CCAA court should have “adequate
data as to what factors of public interest are involved.”2
34235 In Edwards’ model of CCAA
decision-making, these data would be analyzed alongside information about the
company’s finances, the sale value of its assets, and projected earnings after
reorganization.

In short, Edwards also understood the public interest in terms of

quantifiable investments and he saw the public interest as a core concern of the CCAA,
which was designed in response to the economic and social devastation of the Great
Depression.236 For these reasons, Sarra’s account of restructuring - and broadly speaking,

234 Ibid at 108.
235 Stanley E Edwards, “Reorganizations Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act” (1947) 25
Can Bar Rev 587 at 601.
236 Ibid at 590.
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Elizabeth Warren’s as well - best reflects the underlying purposes of restructuring law.
(iv) Conclusion
This chapter began by examining several competing theories of restructuring law.
It discussed the various shortcomings of a narrow economic-based model as well as the
value-based model. It then discussed how an economic-based rehabilitation model that
permits a broad definition of restructuring’s stakeholders, where appropriate, can take
into account the public interest without sacrificing the rights of more traditional creditor
groups. This model is consistent with the history and purpose of the CCAA as discussed
in the first two chapters of this thesis.
The public interest is an important consideration in Canadian restructuring law.
Where the public interest might be engaged by some aspect of a restructuring, it
behooves counsel and the courts to consider whether the public interest will be helped or
harmed by the court’s decision. This is especially true of liquidations under the CCAA.
As discussed in Chapters I and II, Parliament, commentators and the courts have
acknowledged that liquidation can have negative social and economic consequences for a
broad constituency of stakeholders. The term “public interest” is essentially a short-form
for the interests of these stakeholders. Chapter IV will discuss why the problem of
liquidations under the CCAA has not been resolved by the creation of section 36 of the
Act, which authorizes the court approval of asset sales. Chapter V will address the
problem directly by evaluating the arguments for and against CCAA liquidations in light
of the history, purpose and place of the CCAA in Canada’s bankruptcy and insolvency
regime.
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IV.

CCAA ASSET SALES AND THE FAILURE OF SECTION 36

(1) Introduction
This chapter examines the process for court approval of asset sales under the
CCAA. Although the common law has allowed asset sales with the approval of the
supervising judge for some time, the rules on asset sales have been codified only recently
in the September 2009 amendments to the CCAA.

These amendments introduced a

new provision, section 36, which provides guidelines for courts to consider when
deciding whether to approve asset sales.
This chapter begins by looking at the key cases on asset sales prior to the 2009
amendments. It then considers the amendments and subsequent cases and commentaries,
analyzing the impact of the 2009 amendments on the sale approval process. This analysis
leads to a surprising conclusion: in major asset sale cases thus far, courts have largely
ignored section 36 as a substantive test for whether to approve asset sales. In some cases,
courts have said that section 36 is not a definitive test at all. This is surprising because
the Joint Task Force on Business and Insolvency Law Reform and the Standing Senate
Committee on Banking, Trade and Finance recommended enacting section 36 to provide
“substantive direction” to courts in deciding whether to approve a sale of assets.

q

Despite this recommendation, recent cases suggest that section 36 is only one of many
considerations in the approval of asset sales and is not substantive. This will be discussed
below in Part (v) of this chapter.23789

237 An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the
Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 o f the Statutes o f Canada, 2005, SC 2007, c 36.
238
Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36 s 36.
239

Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the
Burden: A Review o f the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act
(November 2003) (Chair: Richard H Kroft) at 146.
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A second conclusion is that section 36 has done nothing to resolve the ongoing
disagreement among judges and academics over “liquidating CCAAs” - that is, the use of
CCAA proceedings to effect the sale of substantially all the assets of a debtor company,
often where no plan is presented to creditors and where there is no intention of continuing
the debtor company as a going concern. This is unfortunate because the Senate
Committee intended that section 36 provide “some guidance with regard to minimum
requirements to be met during the sale process.”240 However, section 36 cannot fully
resolve the dispute over liquidating CCAAs because it makes no mention of them.
Although section 36 has answered a procedural question - do courts have the authority to
approve asset sales? - it has not answered the substantive question: under what
circumstances, if any, are liquidating CCAAs appropriate? This question is important
given the different approaches to liquidating CCAAs in the courts. This will be discussed
further in Chapter V.
(ii) Common Law on Asset Sales Prior to the 2009 Amendments
(a) Ontario
In the 1998 decision of Re Canadian Red Cross Society,241 Blair J., as he then
was, approved a CCAA sale of substantially all of the assets of the Red Cross. In doing

240

Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the
Burden: A Review o f the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act

(November 2003) (Chair: Richard H Kroft) at 148 (emphasis added).
241 (1998), 5 CBR (4th) 299 (Ont CJ [Commercial List]).
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so, Blair J. held that the supervising judge in a CCAA proceeding had the authority to
approve asset sale plans, even before a creditor vote:242
The source o f the authority is twofold: it is to be found in the power o f the Court to
impose terms and conditions on the granting o f a stay under section 11; and it may be
grounded upon the inherent jurisdiction o f the Court, not to make orders which contradict
a statute, but to "fill in the gaps in legislation so as to give effect to the objects o f the
CCAA, including the survival program o f a debtor until it can present a plan”.

In approving the transaction, Blair J. applied two tests.

Firstly, he found that the

purchase price was “fair and reasonable” based on the reports of the Monitor, financial
advisors, and other independent experts involved.243 Next, he considered the four “duties”
of the Court in approving an asset sale, as established by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Royal Bank v. Soundair:244
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

to consider whether the debtor has made a sufficient effort to obtain the best
price and has not acted improvidently
to consider the interests o f the parties
to consider the efficacy and integrity o f the process by which offers have been
obtained
to consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out o f the process

Notably, Blair J. applied this test by analogy, since Soundair de alt with the
requirements for approval of a sale by a court-appointed receiver, not for CCAA sales.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, Soundair has become an important test for
CCAA sales since the Red Cross decision.
In Re Tiger Brand Knitting Co,245 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
considered an application by the debtor company for an extension of time to negotiate
with a prospective purchaser. The offering process for the going concern sale of the
company’s assets had ended and the Monitor was expected to finalize negotiations with a
242 Ibid at para 43.
243 Ibid at para 49.
244 (1991), 7 CBR (3d) 1 (Ont CA); Re Canadian Red Cross Society (1998), 5 CBR (4th) 299 (Ont CJ
[Commercial List]) at paras 47-48. The Soundair factors were laid out originally in Crown Trust Co v
Rosenberg (1986), 60 OR (2d) 87 (Ont HC).
245 (2005), 9 CBR (5th) 315 (Ont Sup Ct).
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prospective purchaser shortly.246 C. Campbell J. applied the four factors from Soundair
and found that they had been satisfied.247 In doing so, C. Campbell J. stated that the
Soundair factors “are implicit in a marketing and sale process pursuant to Court Order
under the CCAA.”248249501
More recently, in Re Nortel Networks Corp,2A9 the same Court approved a CCAA
•

«

sale process according to the following factors:

9S0

(a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
(b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
(c) do any o f the debtors' creditors have a bona fide reason to object to a sale o f the
business?
(d) is there a better viable alternative?

These factors have become known as the Nortel criteria. As will be discussed below in
Part (iv) of this chapter, these criteria apply to the approval of a CCAA sale process such as an auction - in the absence of a restructuring plan. They do not apply to the
approval of the final sale transaction at the conclusion of the auction. However, in
approving the sale process in Re Nortel Networks, the Court noted that the debtor would
“aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in Royal Bank
v. Soundair Corp”25[ In a subsequent hearing at the conclusion of the auction process,
the Court applied the Soundair factors, found that they had been satisfied, and approved
•

the final sale. In doing so, Morawetz J. stated:

TO

Although the Soundair and Crown Trust tests were established for the sale o f assets by a
receiver, the principles have been considered to be appropriate for sale o f assets as part o f
a court supervised sales process in a CCAA proceeding.

(b) Québec
246 Ibid at paras 15-16.
247 Ibid at paras 34-37.
248 Ibid at para 35.
249(2009), 55 CBR (5th) 229 (Ont Sup Ct).
250 Ibid at para 49.
251 Ibid at para 53.
252 Re Nortel Networks Corp, 56 CBR (5th) 229 (Ont Sup Ct) at paras 34-36.
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Québec courts have not applied Soundair directly in all CCAA asset sale cases,
but their decisions often reference Soundair and consider the factors indirectly when
determining whether to approve sales.
In Les Boutiques San Francisco,253 the Québec Superior Court approved a CCAA
sale where the bank syndicate and Monitor supported it, the sale price was the best
possible price at the end of the sale process and was greater than the liquidation value of
the company, and the sale would allow most employees to keep their jobs.25425These
factors appear to overlap with the Soundair factors, though Soundair was not cited in the
decision.
In Re Mecachrome Canada Inc 255 the same Court refused to approve a plan in
which interim (DIP) lenders would acquire all the shares of the debtor company where
the debtor had failed to properly canvass the market for bidders.25625789The Court cited
Soundair and Tiger Brand Knitting but did not apply the Soundair test directly:
As stated, albeit in a different but still similar context, by the Ontario Court o f Appeal in'

Soundair, by the Ontario Superior Court o f Justice in Tiger Brand Knitting, by the
Alberta Court o f Queen's Bench in Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re, and by this
Court...in a process such as this one, there has to be some demonstration by the Canadian
Debtors that reasonable attempts have been made to properly canvass the market before
approving a PFA that is, in essence, presented to the affected creditors as the best
available deal under the circumstances.

In Re Rail Power Technologies Corp,

the Court applied the Soundair test in

approving the sale of substantially all of the debtor company’s assets.
Court emphasized that the Monitor had recommended the sale:

In doing so, the

9SQ

The issue o f unfairness in the process identified in Soundair, concerns actions o f the

253 (2004), 5 CBR (5th) 197 (Qc Sup Ct).
254 Ibid at para 3.
255 Re Mecachrome Canada Inc (2009), 58 CBR (5th) 49 (Qc Sup Ct).
256 Ibid at para 45.
257 2009 QCCS 2885.
258 Ibid at para 51.
259 Ibid at para 93, citing Re Winnipeg Motor Express Inc, 2008 MBQB 297 at para 24.
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receiver typically towards a potential purchaser. As long as the receiver has acted
reasonably prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily, its recommendation should be accepted.

(c) Alberta
In Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.,260 the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the
lower court’s decision to appoint a receiver instead of using the CCAA to sell
substantially all the assets of the debtor company. The Court of Appeal held that a sale of
assets under the CCAA should only occur where the proposed transaction is “in the best
interests of the creditors generally” and that this requirement was not met by the sale of
substantially all of the debtor’s assets with no continued involvement by creditors and
shareholders.26126In contrast to the Ontario and Québec approaches to CCAA sales, the
Court also distinguished between CCAA and receivership proceedings, stating that a
CCAA judge must wait for creditor approval before sanctioning a plan:
Under the CCAA the court has no discretion to sanction a plan unless it has been
approved by a vote o f 2/3 majority in value o f each class o f creditors (section 6). To that
extent, each class o f creditors has a veto. This procedure is quite different from a courtappointed receivership. In a receivership the desires o f the creditors are a significant
factor, but the approval by a specific majority o f creditors is not a pre-condition to court
sanction, and creditors do not have an absolute veto. The difference in the procedures
gives rise to different tests and considerations to be applied in each type o f proceeding.
While in this case the lending syndicate’s desires in the CCAA and receivership
proceedings were consistent, the chambers judge was not required to give the same
weight to their wishes in each proceeding.

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal applied the Soundair test to the receiver’s
proposed sale.263
In Re 843504 Alberta Ltd.,264 the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench refused to
approve a CCAA sale of substantially all of the debtor company’s assets before the
Monitor had presented a formal plan to the creditors. The Court did not apply the

260 (1999), 11 CBR (4th) 230 (Alta CA).
261 Ibid at para 16.
262 Ibid at para 14.
263 Ibid at para 32.
264 (2003), 4 CBR (5th) 306 (Alta QB).
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Soundair test to the proposed sale. Instead, the Court cited Fracmaster and distinguished
the Ontario Superior Court decision in Red Cross, stating:
Simply put, in this province the corporate entity is expected to continue in some form or
another unless there are exceptional circumstances. Liquidation proceedings are typically
reserved for receiverships, windings up or bankruptcy. . .This is quite different than in
Ontario where apparently debtors can use the benefits o f the legislation when there is no
prospect o f corporate survival or no plan o f arrangement is proposed.

Despite the above cases, in Re CalpineCanada Energy Ltd.,

Romaine J. of the

Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench applied the Soundair test in a DIP financing sale under
the CCAA despite the fact that Soundair was a case dealing with a receivership:

967

While the Soundairca.se involved a receivership and this is a situation o f a debtor-in
possession under the CCAA overseen by a Monitor, these duties remain relevant to the
issues before me, with some adaptation for the differences in the form o f proceedings.

The Court in Calpine gave final approval to the plan following the satisfaction of
previously imposed conditions intended to ensure fairness and transparency in the sale
negotiation process.

The Court emphasized that the Monitor supported the plan and

that this was an important factor in determining whether to approve it, as expressed in
Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg:265278269
If the court were to reject the recommendations o f the Receiver in any but the most
exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function
o f the Receiver both in the perception o f receivers and in the perception o f any others
who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the
decision o f the Receiver was o f little weight and that the real decision was always made
upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible o f immensely
damaging results to the disposition o f assets by court-appointed receivers.

(d) British Columbia

265 Ibid at paras 14-15.
266 2007 ABQB 49.
267 Ibid at para 29.
268 Ibid at paras 31-34.
269 (1986), 39 DLR (4th) 326 (Ont HC) at 112, cited in Re Calpine Canada Energy Ltd, 2007 ABQB 49 at
para 52. This statement was adopted by the Ontario Court o f Appeal in Royal Bank v Soundair (1991), 7
CBR (3d) 1 (Ont CA) at para 21.
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Courts in British Columbia generally will refuse to approve CCAA sales
involving substantially all the assets of the debtor company where a plan has not been
presented to the creditors. In Cliffs Over Maple Bay,270 the British Columbia Court of
Appeal reversed the CCAA supervising judge’s decision granting a stay of proceedings
under section 11 that would have allowed the debtor company to restructure and obtain
DIP financing without presenting a plan to its creditors. Tysoe J.A. stated that while the
filing of a draft plan of arrangement was not a prerequisite for obtaining a stay under
section 11, a stay should not be granted where the debtor company has no intention to
present a plan to its creditors.271 Notably, the Court of Appeal made its decision despite
the Monitor’s support for the plan.272 In obiter, Tysoe J.A. stated:273
I need not decide the point on this appeal, I query whether the court should grant a stay
under the CCAA to permit a sale, windingup or liquidation without requiring the matter to
be voted upon by the creditors if the plan o f arrangement intended to bemade by the
debtor company will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or
liquidation be distributedto its creditors.

While Tysoe J.A. made no reference to a specific case, this obiter clearly questions the
Ontario approach of allowing a CCAA sale of substantially all of the debtor company’s
assets before a plan is presented to the creditors.
(e) Conclusions on the Common Law Relating to Asset Sales Prior to 2009
The above cases demonstrate that there is a divergence in judicial approaches to
the approval of CCAA asset sales between courts in Ontario and Québec, on the one
hand, and courts in Alberta and British Columbia, on the other. With some exceptions,
Western courts are less likely to approve sales in which the debtor company will not
present a plan to its creditors and will not continue as a going concern after restructuring.
270 Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd v Fisgard Capital Corp, 2008 BCCA 327.
271 Ibid at para 31.
272 Ibid at paras 14-15.
273 Ibid at para 32.
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Their rationale is that these sorts of sales are liquidations, and it is generally inappropriate
to use the CCAA in such cases when the sales can be completed through a receivership.
The use of the Soundair factors in CCAA sales, factors that were intended to
apply to sales by receivers, is less than ideal from a theoretical perspective because the
CCAA is a restructuring statute.

As will be discussed further in Chapter V, the

distinction between restructuring and liquidation is important. Significantly, in Cliffs
Over Maple Bay, the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated that courts should not
grant CCAA protection to a debtor company that “does not intend to propose a
compromise or arrangement to its creditors.”274275Likewise, the Alberta Court of Appeal in
Fracmaster expressed the view that liquidations should not occur under the CCAA in
.

most circumstances:

275

There must be an ongoing business entity that will survive the asset sale. . . A sale o f all
or substantially all the assets o f a company to an entirely different entity, with no
continued involvement by former creditors and shareholders, does not meet this
requirement. While we do not intend to limit the flexibility o f the CCAA, we are
concerned about its use to liquidate assets o f insolvent companies which are not part o f a
plan or compromise among creditors and shareholders, resulting in some continuation of
a company as a going concern. Generally, such liquidations are inconsistent with the
intent o f the CCAA and should not be carried out under its protective umbrella.

It is unsurprising that the above cases make no mention of Soundair in the context of
CCAA sales because Soundair applies to liquidations by receivers.

If wholesale

liquidations should not occur under the CCAA - as Cliffs and Fracmaster suggest - then
Soundair is not particularly relevant in the context of CCAA sales.
It makes sense that courts considering CCAA liquidations would turn to the
Soundair factors, since until recently Soundair provided the only guidance. However,
with Parliament adding section 36, courts are granted the express authority to approve

274 Ibid at para 31.
275 Royal Bank v Fracmaster Ltd (1999), 11 CBR (4th) 230 (Alta CA) at para. 16.
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asset sales under the CCAA and are instructed to consider specific factors. In light of
this, one might think that courts would come to favour the section 36 factors over those
of Soundair. As will be discussed below, this has not come to pass, and the result has
been a series of muddled analyses in Ontario and Québec in which the courts have
considered different combinations of Soundair, section 36 and other factors. It remains
to be seen whether Western courts will do the same, or whether they will simply focus on
section 36 when asked to approve asset sales under the CCAA.
(ïii) The 2009 Amendments: Section 36 of the CCAA
(a) The Text of Section 36
Coming into force on September 18, 2009, section 36 is a new provision granting
the CCAA court express jurisdiction to authorize asset sales in restructuring proceedings.
Subsection (1) requires that a debtor company obtain court authorization before selling
assets outside the ordinary course of its business in a restructuring.

Additionally,

subsection (2) requires that the debtor company notify all secured creditors who are
“likely to be affected by the proposed sale.” Subsection (3) lists several factors that the
court must consider in deciding whether to authorize a sale:
(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other
things,
(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the
circumstances;
( b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
(c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale
or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a
bankruptcy;
( d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
(e) the effects o f the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested
parties; and
(J) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking
into account their market value.

Importantly, this is a non-exclusive list, as subsection (3) provides that the court is to
consider these factors “among other things.” These additional considerations will be
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examined in the following section. It is also noteworthy that the Monitor is not formally
required to file a report in respect of a proposed sale, despite subsections (3)(b) and (c)
asking the court to consider the Monitor’s opinion.276
Subsection (4) provides that where the proposed sale is to a “related party,”277 the
court must first consider the factors in subsection (3) and then be satisfied that:
(a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose o f the assets to persons who
are not related to the company; and
( b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be
received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the
proposed sale or disposition.

(b) The Purpose of Section 36
In its report, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden, the Standing Senate
Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce suggested that the section 36 amendments
were intended to provide courts with “substantive direction” on factors to consider when
deciding whether to approve asset sales.278 In discussing the purpose of section 36 with
regard to the sale process, the Committee stated:279
[TJhere are circumstances where all stakeholders would benefit from the opportunity for
an insolvent company involved in a reorganization to divest itself o f all or part o f its
assets, whether to raise capital, eliminate further loss for creditors or focus on the solvent
operations o f the business. We feel, however, that the Court must be involved in
approving such sales and that it should be provided with some guidance regarding
minimum requirements to be met during the sale process.

The Committee did not mention Soundair in its brief discussion of asset sales and there is
no suggestion that section 36 was intended to replace the common law approach of
276 The CBA recommended that the Monitor be required to file a report in respect o f a proposed sale in its
written submission on Bill C-55 to the House Committee in November 2005, at 44. Available online:
<www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf05-52-eng.pdf>. See also E Patrick Shea, Bankruptcy & Insolvency
Act, Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act, Bill C-55 & Commentary (Toronto: LexisNexis 2006).
277 A “related party” is defined in subsection (5) as:
(a) a director or officer o f the company;
( b) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact o f the company; and
(c) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (a) or ( b).
278 Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the

Burden: A Review o f the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act
(November 2003) (Chair: Richard H Kroft) at 146.
279 Emphasis added. Ibid at 146-147.
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applying the Soundair criteria. However, the Committee seems to have expected that the
section 36 factors would constitute “minimum requirements” that debtor companies
would have to meet when asking for court approval of asset sales under the CCAA. In
other words, while the amendments should not be read to preclude Soundair, section 36
was intended to be substantive.

Surprisingly, the recent treatment of section 36 in

Ontario and Québec does not reflect this intention. This is discussed below.
(iv) The Impact of the 2009 Amendments on Judicial Approaches to Asset Sales
(a) When Will Courts Apply Section 36?
Despite the Senate Committee’s intention that section 36 provide substantive
direction to courts in approving asset sales, the interpretations of section 36 by courts so
far suggests that section 36 is not substantive. This has created uncertainty in the judicial
analysis of asset sales.
In Re Canwest Global Communications Corp,m) the first in a series of
proceedings dealing with section 36, Pepall J. of the Ontario Superior Court considered
the circumstances in which the section 36 criteria would apply to a proposed sale of
assets. Firstly, in order for section 36 to be engaged, the threshold requirements must be
met:280281
Court approval is required under section 36 if:
(a) a debtor company under CCAA protection
(b) proposes to sell or dispose o f assets outside the ordinary course o f business.

Pepall J. made two important holdings with respect to these threshold requirements.
Firstly, she held that while partnerships are not expressly included in the definitions of
“debtor company” and “company” in subsection 2(1) of the CCAA, section 36
280 2009 CarswellOnt 7169 (Ont Sup Ct).
281 Ibid at para 26.
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nonetheless applied to the partnerships that were under CCAA protection in Canwest.
This holding should be viewed within the fact-specific context of the Canwest
proceedings. The limited partnerships in Canwest were highly integrated with those of
the debtor companies under CCAA protection. Therefore, Peppall J. reasoned that even
though the partnerships were not “debtor companies” under the CCAA, the Court had
inherent jurisdiction to extend CCAA protection to the partnerships. This analysis is less
than ideal because it provides no clear rule for when a partnership will enjoy CCAA
protection, but it is nonetheless in line with previous Ontario decisions in which courts
have extended CCAA protection to entities that do not fall within the definition of a
CCAA “debtor company” where those entities are highly integrated with a debtor
company or companies undergoing restructuring.283
Secondly, Pepall J. held that when determining whether a proposed sale was in
the “ordinary course of business” within the meaning of section 36, a court should
conduct a fact specific inquiry:284
[A] court should in each case examine the circumstances o f the subject transaction within
the context o f the business carried on by the debtor.

In her decision, Pepall J. held that section 36 did not apply to the transfer of shared assets
and services in an “internal reorganization transaction” within the same corporate
family.285 In Peppall J.’s view, it would have been “commercially unreasonable” to
expect the debtor companies to satisfy the requirements of section 36(4) for sales to third
parties because of the “highly integrated and interdependent” businesses of the parties.286
The Canwest family of entities had previously adopted a complex business structure for
282

Ibid at para 30.
See especially Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd (1993), 17 CBR (3d) 24 (Ont Sup Ct).
284
Re Canwest Global Communications Corp, 2009 CarswellOnt 7169 (Ont Sup Ct) at para 35.
285
Ibid at para 36.
286
Ibid
283
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tax reasons that no longer applied, and the proposed transactions would merely “realign
the shared services arrangements” between these entities.

As such, Pepall J. was

careful to note that not all internal reorganizations would fall outside the purview of
section 36.288
The above analysis of when section 36(4) should apply makes sense based on the
specific facts of Canwest, but the implications for section 36 are troubling. The 2003
Senate report states that sales to related parties should not be permitted other than in
“exceptional circumstances.”289 Perhaps transfers between highly integrated entities
undergoing restructuring should be exempt because they are exceptional circumstances,
but this requires further inquiry.

Instead, Pepall J. relied simply on a statement by

Industry Canada that section 36(4) was intended to address the problem of “phoenix
corporations”, i.e. companies whose owners engage in serial bankruptcies in order to
purchase assets of the bankrupt business through a new entity and leave creditors
unpaid.290291This ignores the fact that related parties may have other interests in asset sales
beyond “phoenix corporation” schemes - for example, incumbent management simply
might be trying to entrench itself by devising a new internal structure for the corporate
family.
Pepall J. went on to say that even where a proposed sale is outside the ambit of
section 36 because it is in the ordinary course of business, section 36 “may be considered
in assessing fairness” where the sale is to a related party.

On this account, courts in

288 Ibid at para 35.
289 Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the

Burden: A Review o f the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
(November 2003) (Chair: Richard H Kroft) at 148.
290 Ibid at para 34.
291 Ibid at para 37.
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such cases should consider, at a minimum, whether the proposed sale is fair and
facilitates the restructuring. On this basis, Pepall J. then applied the provisions of section
36 to the proposed sale and found that they had been satisfied.

As a consequence of

this analysis, it now appears that courts have the discretion to decide when to apply
section 36 to proposed related party sales. In effect, Pepall J. substituted a test of whether
the proposed transaction is “fair and facilitates the restructuring” in place of the clear
wording of section 36(4):
(4) If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the company, the court may,
after considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), grant the authorization only if it is
satisfied that
(a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose o f the assets to persons who
are not related to the company; and

(b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be
received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the
proposed sale or disposition.

In the third Canwest proceeding,2
92293 Pepall J. held that section 36 did not apply to
transfers contemplated by a restructuring plan because the plan as a whole was subject to
court approval. In that case, the asset transfers contemplated had been approved by a vote
of the affected creditors.294 This suggests that section 36 applies only to asset sales in the
absence of a restructuring plan.

This holding is problematic in light of the view

expressed by Western courts that the CCAA should not be used to effect liquidations in
the absence of a formal plan.295While it remains to be seen how Western courts will apply
section 36, it seems unlikely that they will interpret it in the same manner as the Court in
Canwest.

292 Ibid at para 38.
293 (2010), 70 CBR (5th) 1 (Ont Sup Ct).
294 Ibid at para 27.
295 Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd v Fisgard Capital Corp, 2008 BCCA 327 at para 32.
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In Re Brainhunter296 a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court, Morawetz
J. approved a “stalking horse”297 bid process where the purchaser was a related party and
an insider of the company, without applying section 36 of the CCAA. Morawetz J. held
that section 36 is engaged only where the court is asked to approve an “actual sale” of
assets. Approval of an “actual sale” was to be distinguished from approval of a “sale
process” such as an auction.298 Accordingly, Morawetz J. did not apply section 36 to
determine if the proposed sale process was appropriate, relying instead on the common
law test laid out in Re Nortel Networks Corp.299
There are at least three problems with the above analysis in Brainhunter. Firstly,
despite holding that section 36 is not engaged in the approval of a sale process, Morawetz
J. stated that section 36 “should also be considered indirectly when applying the Nortel
Criteria.”300 Unfortunately, the Court did not expand on this point. Presumably, section
36 should be considered indirectly at the process stage because it will apply eventually
when the court must decide whether to approve the final sale. In Nortel, for example,
Morawetz J. considered it important that the debtor would “aim to satisfy” the Soundair

296 Re Brainhunter Inc (2009), 62 CBR (5th) 41 (Ont Sup Ct).
297 A common arrangement in US bankruptcy law and prevalent in cross-border proceedings, this involves
an auction in which the seller designates a “stalking horse” buyer who has the right to bid first in the
auction, setting a minimum price that precludes low-ball offers. If the stalking horse is out-bid by
subsequent bidders, it typically receives a previously agreed-upon break-fee from the seller for its
expenses. It is not a legal term o f art as such, but stalking horses have been used in several recent cases.
See Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009), 56 CBR (5th) 224 (Ont Sup Ct) as an example o f a sales process
involving a stalking horse auction.
298 Re Brainhunter Inc (2009), 62 CBR (5th) 41 (Ont Sup Ct) at paras 16-17.
299 (2009), 55 CBR (5th) 229 (Ont Sup Ct). The court’s authority to approve a sale process is derived from
its general statutory discretion. In deciding whether to approve a sale process, the Nortel criteria require
the court to consider:
(a) Is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
(b) Will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
(c) Do any o f the debtors' creditors have a bona fide reason to object to a sale o f the
business?
(d) Is there a better viable alternative?
300 Ibid at para 16.
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factors for approval of the final sale in its conduct during the sale process.

T At

Moreover,

in the earlier decision of Tiger Brand Knitting, discussed above, C. Campbell J. of the
Ontario Superior Court stated that the Soundair factors “are implicit in a marketing and
sale process pursuant to Court Order under the CCAA.”

This suggests that both

Soundair and section 36 are “implicit” in the approval of a sale process under the Nortel
criteria. However, exactly what this means for the judicial analysis is unclear. Is it
sufficient for approval of the sale process, as it was in Nortel, that the debtor merely
“aim[s] to satisfy” the criteria for court approval of the final sale?
The second problem is that the section 36 criteria are tied up with the asset sale
process and the Nortel criteria.

Specifically, subsection 36(3) asks (a) whether the

process leading up to the proposed sale was reasonable, and (b) whether the Monitor
approved the process. These questions are also fundamental to the court’s analysis in
deciding whether to approve the sale process. Under the Nortel criteria, the court must
ask whether the sale transaction is warranted.

Often, this analysis includes a

consideration of the Monitor’s recommendation with respect to the proposed process and
whether the process is fair and reasonable. Therefore, by the time the court directly
applies section 36 to the final sale transaction, it has decided its answers to questions (a)
and (b) already at the process approval stage. This is problematic because the Senate
Committee stated that section 36 was meant to provide “substantive direction” to the
courts. Since some of the main questions asked by section 36 will be answered already
under the Nortel criteria, it is difficult to see how section 36 can provide substantive
direction.3012

301 Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009), 55 CBR (5th) 229 (Ont Sup Ct).
302 Re Tiger Brand Knitting Co (2005), 9 CBR (5th) 315 (Ont Sup Ct) at para 35.
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The third, related problem is that it is difficult to imagine many cases where a
court would hold that section 36 has not been satisfied at the conclusion of a sale process
approved under the Nortel criteria. Where the participants have followed the process as
sanctioned by the court and the Monitor recommends the final sale, it is a practical
impossibility for the court to refuse. In short, once the court sanctions and sets in motion
the sale process, the most important test has been met already. Since section 36 is only
considered indirectly at this initial stage, if at all, section 36 can provide neither the
substantive direction nor the minimum requirements that the Senate Committee intended,
(b) What Additional Factors Will the Court Consider?
Since section 36 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider, courts have
considered other factors in determining the appropriateness of sale proposals. In the
second Canwest decision,303 Pepall J. approved the sale of substantially all of the
financial and operating assets of the Canwest limited partnership entities.

Pepall J.

applied both section 36 and the Soundair criteria to the proposed sale because section 36
had not yet come into force. However, the Court took the approach that section 36 had
not changed the analysis very much and that it was quite similar to Soundair, stating
“[ijndeed, to a large degree, the criteria overlap.”304 Consequently, it is unclear exactly
which factors must be satisfied in order to obtain court approval of a sale. Section 36 has
not replaced the Soundair factors and evidently, courts may still give serious
consideration to the Soundair factors when asked to approve asset plans. As discussed
below, this is problematic.

303 (2010), 68 CBR (5th) 233 (Ont Sup Ct).
304 Ibid at para 13.
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In Re White Birch Paper,305 the Québec Superior Court approved the sale of
substantially all the assets of a debtor company in a “stalking horse” bid process where
all of the preliminary steps of the process had been approved without objection from the
interested stakeholders.306 In his reasons, Mongeon J.C.S. applied the criteria for court
approval of asset sales in section 36 and found that they had been satisfied. In doing so,
Mongeon J.C.S. stated:307308
The elements which can be found in Section 36 CCAA are, first o f all, not limitative and
secondly need not be all fulfilled in order to grant or not grant an order under this section.
The Court has to look at the transaction as a whole and essentially decide whether or not
the sale is appropriate, fair and reasonable. In other words, the Court could grant the
process for reasons other than those mentioned in Section 36 CCAA or refuse to grant it
for reasons which are not mentioned in Section 36 CCAA.

Citing Canwest3m the Court went on to say that it was not necessary for approval of a
plan that all classes of creditors will benefit, and that the Court “must rely” on the
Monitor’s recommendation of whether to support the plan.309 Mongeon J.C.S. then
applied the Nortel criteria to the sale process and found that they had been satisfied.310 In
effect, the Court determined that section 36 was not the substantive test for approving the
asset sales and substituted its own test, asking whether “the sale is appropriate, fair and
reasonable.”311
Based on the above cases, the exact role of section 36 remains unclear. There is
overlap between the section 36 and Soundair criteria, but they are not the same.
Additionally, it is unclear what should happen if a court finds that the Soundair criteria
305 Re White Birch Paper Holding Co, 2010 QCCS 4915.
306 Ibid at para 25. The only objections came from two construction lien holders, whose objections became
moot by the time o f the final order approving the sale, as separate agreements had been made to honour
these claims.
307 Emphasis added. Ibid at paras 48-49.
308 Re Canwest Global Communications Corp. (2010), 68 CBR (5th) 233 (Ont Sup Ct) at para 13.
309 Re White Birch Paper Holding Co, 2010 QCCS 4915 at paras 51-52.
310 Ibid at paras 53-54.
311 Ibid at para 49.
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have been satisfied, but the section 36 criteria have not. If section 36 is intended to be
substantive, then the analysis in an asset sale approval proceeding should focus on section
36. It may be acceptable to consider the Soundair criteria or other factors in these
proceedings, but the section 36 criteria are the minimum requirements that must be met.
However, the above cases suggest that the opposite is true. Section 36 will be read
narrowly so as not to apply in many cases, or so that only some section 36 criteria apply.
Meanwhile, the Soundair criteria, a “fairness and reasonableness” test or some other
criteria might apply instead.
(v) Ongoing Problems Related to Section 36
(a) Asset Sales Generally
While courts in other provinces have not yet had the opportunity to comment,
Ontario and Québec courts have recognized at least three different sets of criteria for
determining the appropriateness of asset sales in the restructuring context. As discussed
above, this is problematic. In short, the current approach to asset sales in these provinces
suggests that section 36 cannot provide the substantive direction that the Senate
Committee and the Joint Task Force intended when they recommended*the new provision
in 2003.312 Nor is the holding in White Birch that the section 36 factors “need not be all
fulfilled”313314to approve a sale consistent with the intention - again expressed in the Senate
Report - that section 36 provide some minimum requirements that must be met before a
i 314
court can approve an asset sale.

312 Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the
Burden: A Review o f the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act
(November 2003) (Chair: Richard H Kroft) at 146.
313 Re White Birch Paper Holding Co, 2010 QCCS 4915 at para 48.
314 Senate, Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the

Burden: A Review o f the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act
(November 2003) (Chair: Richard H Kroft) at 148
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Courts and commentators often praise the flexibility of the CCAA regime.
Flexibility is a useful feature of a restructuring regime involving large, complex
companies.

However, where Parliament has provided clear, substantive direction on

asset sales, courts should pay heed. Unfortunately, it seems that the addition of section
36 has served only to make an already complex legal analysis less clear. If the current
situation persists, Parliament will need to introduce further amendments to resolve the
confusion. For example, the sale approval process could be streamlined by amending
section 36 to include a modified set of the Soundair factors, with changes where
necessary to reflect the different circumstances of restructuring and receivership sales.
Parliament also might specify in the Act that section 36 is a substantive test that lays out
minimum requirements for CCAA sales. Until this is done, both sets of criteria - and
perhaps other factors - will remain applicable, and no clear rule will govern.
(b) The Liquidation vs. Reorganization Debate: Still Alive And Well
The advent of section 36 has not resolved the controversy over “liquidating
CCAAs” - the use of CCAA proceedings to effect a sale of assets by the debtor company
with no intention of continuing the debtor company as a going concern. Section 36
makes no mention of liquidating CCAAs. However, as the above cases illustrate, courts
in Ontario and Québec have continued to approve liquidating plans under the CCAA.
Meanwhile, courts in Alberta and British Columbia have expressed skepticism of
liquidating CCAAs, especially where no plan is presented to the creditors and where it
does not appear that the business operations of the debtor company will continue
following liquidation.

82

Prior to the 2009 amendments introducing section 36, one commentator - now a
judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court - noted:315
The amendment will no doubt resolve the question o f jurisdiction regarding asset sales,
but will not resolve how the court ought to exercise its discretion. . .Further, the
amendment does not address procedural questions such as whether a Plan o f
Arrangement approving the sale must be voted upon by its creditors before any sale takes
place. This issue was raise by Tysoe J.A. in Cliffs Over Maple Bay, and again goes to the
fundamental issue o f whether the creditors and the court must endorse a substantive
course o f action proposed by the debtor company under the CCAA instead o f the asset
liquidations being presented to the creditors as a fait accompli.

As these remarks suggest, the debate over liquidating CCAAs raises fundamental
questions about the underlying policy goals of Canada’s restructuring regime. Section 36
does not solve the problem, because while the provision recognizes that going concern
sales may be appropriate in some cases, it does not specify when courts should approve
these sales or whether other types of liquidating CCAAs are appropriate.

This is a

question about the limits of judicial discretion under the CCAA, and it can only be
answered by considering the purpose of the statute as a whole.
(vii). Conclusion
While section 36 was intended to provide substantive direction and guidance on
minimum requirements for approving CCAA asset sales, courts have continued to apply
other common law tests such as Soundair. Consequently, section 36 has had the opposite
effect than intended: it further complicates the judicial analysis.

This problem will

remain unresolved until Parliament or the Supreme Court of Canada lays down a clear
rule to streamline the sale approval process.
Moreover, section 36 has not resolved the dispute over whether liquidating CCAAs
Eire appropriate, and under what circumstances. As discussed both in this and previous
315 Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs - Are We Praying to False Gods?” (2008) Annual Review o f

Insolvency Law 33 at 44-45.
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chapters, this problem has divided the courts of the different provinces.

It is a

fundamental problem because it depends on the interpretation of the underlying purposes
of the CCAA.
Chapters I and II examined the legislative history and key cases of the CCAA.
Chapter III considered the purposes of the CCAA in the context of different competing
theories of restructuring. This chapter discussed why the addition of section 36 to the
CCAA has not resolved the problem of liquidating CCAAs. Finally, in the following
chapter, the problem of liquidating CCAAs will be examined directly in light of the
analysis thus far.
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V. LIQUIDATING CCAAs AND THE PURPOSE OF RESTRUCTURING IN
CANADA
(i) Introduction
This chapter considers the appropriateness of “liquidating CCAAs.” A liquidating
CCAA has generally become known as the use of CCAA proceedings to effect the sale of
substantially all the assets of a debtor company, often with no plan presented to creditors
and no intention of continuing the debtor company as a going concern. As discussed in
the previous chapter, although section 36 of the CCAA was intended to provide
substantive direction to courts in approving CCAA sales, this aim has not been achieved.
Meanwhile, there is ongoing controversy both within the courts and in the academic
commentary as to whether and when liquidating CCAAs are appropriate. Section 36
cannot resolve this controversy because it makes no mention of liquidating CCAAs, nor
do the general provisions of the CCAA offer helpful guidance in this respect.
Nonetheless, the issue must be examined in light of the diverging judicial approaches to
liquidating CCAAs.
fii) Liquidating CCAAs and the Context of the Debate
The term “liquidating CCAA” has not been clearly defined. The CCAA itself
makes no mention of liquidations and section 36 does not distinguish between different
types of asset sale plans. However, commentators agree that the term might apply to
several different types of sales.316 For example, a liquidation could mean the sale of
substantially all of the debtor company’s assets to: (a) a single buyer who intends to
continue the business operations of the debtor company; (b) many buyers who intend to
continue different parts of the business operations, or (c) many buyers who have no

316 Bill Kaplan, “Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?” [2008] Ann Rev o f Insol L 79 at 86.
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intention of continuing the business operations of the debtor company.

1

T 7

,

It is helpful to

consider these scenarios along a spectrum from least to most objectionable. Although the
debtor company often will cease to exist in all three scenarios, a liquidating CCAA in
which the underlying business operations of the debtor continue - leaving in place jobs
and existing relationships with customers and suppliers - is less objectionable than one in
which the underlying business ceases. This is because part of the purpose of the CCAA
is to avoid the negative social and economic consequences of bankruptcy, such as the loss
of jobs.317318 However, the liquidating CCAA is still to be distinguished from a restructuring
in which the debtor company continues as a going concern, albeit after selling off some
assets, downsizing its business operations, or arranging a new financing structure.319320
In the United States, there has been much debate over whether courts should
approve liquidations under Chapter 11, the corporate reorganization provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code™ In particular, Baird and Rasmussen have argued that liquidations
under Chapter 11 are now the norm in U.S. bankruptcy proceedings.321 According to this
argument, corporate reorganizations have changed fundamentally in recent years and new
reform efforts should focus on maximizing value in liquidations rather than on stopping
the practice:322
The debate over speedy sales o f all the assets o f the business as a going concern is over.
Sales are the norm in large reorganizations that are anything other than a confirmation o f
317 Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs - Are We Praying to False Gods?” [2008] Ann Rev o f Insol
L 33.
318 The question o f whether existing jobs and relationships will be saved has been an important factor for
courts that have approved liquidating CCAAs. For example, see Les Boutiques San Francisco (2004), 7
CBR (5th) 189 (Qc Sup Ct).
319 In Alberta, for example, courts continue to distinguish between liquidating CCAAs, in which the
business survives, and restructurings, in which the company and business both survive. See Royal Bank v
Fracmaster Ltd (1999), 11 CBR (4th) 230 (Alta CA) at paras 15-16.
320 1 1 U.S.C. (2009).
321 Douglas G Baird and Robert K Rasmussen, “Chapter 11 at Twilight” (2003) 56 Stan L Rev 674 at 675.
322 Douglas G Baird, “Car Trouble”, John M Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No 551 at 2.
Available online: <http://ssm.com/abstract=l833731>.
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a debt restructuring reached outside o f bankruptcy. The debate now centers on how sales
should be conducted.

Baird and Rasmussen rely on empirical evidence demonstrating that liquidation is now
the norm in large reorganizations.

However, it is important to note that the above

statement is based on one study of large U.S. reorganizations in 2002. Given the long
history of restructuring, and the fact that several years have passed since this study, these
findings cannot indicate a general trend.

Having said this, many recent large

reorganizations in both the U.S. and Canada have been liquidations, so there is some
evidence to support Baird and Rasmussen’s claim.
Unfortunately, a comprehensive study on this question has not been conducted in
Canada because a database of CCAA proceedings has only become available recently.323
However, a number of large liquidating CCAAs have occurred in recent years, including
those of Nortel Networks,324 Canwest Global325 and Indalex.326 These cases suggest that
the CCAA process is now driven primarily by the secured creditors to maximize their
own returns.

However, if true, this trend would be inconsistent with the CCAA’s

historical purpose as well as a number of recent cases. Although early restructuring
legislation focused on the rights of traditional creditors such as banks, the CCAA has
been concerned with the broader interests of employees and other non-traditional
stakeholders since its inception.327 At the same time, some recent CCAA cases suggest
that courts may have begun to apply CCAA protection in a more restricted manner than
in the past, with the result that more CCAA proceedings will result in traditional
323 The Office o f the Superintendent o f Bankruptcy Canada (OSB) began recording all CCAA filings in
September 2009. Its database is online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br02281.html>
324 Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009), 56 CBR (5th) 224 (Ont Sup Ct).
325 Re Canwest Global Communications Corp, 2009 CarswellOnt 7169 (Ont Sup Ct).
326 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265.
327 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (Toronto:
University o f Toronto Press, 2003) at 16.
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reorganizations rather than liquidations.3283290 This will be discussed further below in Parts
(iv) and (v).
(iii) Diverging Judicial Approaches
.

Liquidating CCAAs are most commonly carried out in Ontario. Courts in Alberta

and British Columbia - jurisdictions historically skeptical of such plans - have approved
liquidating CCAAs only in exceptional circumstances.

In Alberta, the determination

of appropriateness typically turns on the question of whether the debtor company will
survive the proposed sale, as explained in Royal Bank v Fracmaster.
There must be an ongoing business entity that will survive the asset sale. . . A sale o f all
or substantially all the assets o f a company to an entirely different entity, with no
continued involvement by former creditors and shareholders, does not meet this
requirement. . . Generally, such liquidations are inconsistent with the intent o f the CCAA
and should not be carried out under its protective umbrella.

In cases where the debtor company is not intended to survive the proposed liquidation,
Alberta courts have terminated CCAA proceedings and ordered that the liquidation
continue through a receivership.33132 Similarly, courts in British Columbia have expressed
concern with the Ontario practice of approving liquidations under the CCAA where no
restructuring plan is presented, the debtor’s business operations will cease, and the end
result will be a distribution of the proceeds to the creditors.
The approaches to liquidating CCAAs by Ontario courts and those in Alberta and
British Columbia appear irreconcilable. While some Western courts have acknowledged
the appropriateness of Ontario liquidating CCAA decisions such as Canadian Red

328 For a discussion o f this possible new trend, see Alan H Brown, “Liquidating Under the CCAA: An
Overview o f Recent Developments in Cliffs Over Maple Bay and Pope & Talbot' (2008) 17 Cred and Bank
Lit 4.
329 Re 843504 Alberta Ltd (2003), 4 CBR (5th) 306 (Alta QB) at paras 14-15.
330 Royal Bank v Fracmaster L td{ 1999), 11 CBR (4th) 230 (Alta CA) at paras 15-16.
331
332

Ibid.
Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd v Fisgard Capital Corp, 2008 BCCA 327 at para 32.
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Cross333 and Bob-Lo Island,334 where the broader public interest was engaged, these
Western cases are few and far between.335 Additionally, Red Cross and Bob-Lo Island
were cases in which the business operations of the debtor companies were sold on a
going concern basis and remained operational. More generally, Western courts have
expressed skepticism of CCAA proceedings in which the debtor company’s only plan is
to liquidate its assets piecemeal, wind up its business and distribute the proceeds to its
creditors.33637
An important question is whether a liquidating CCAA could serve the broader
public interest by preserving jobs and existing relationships with consumers and suppliers
of the debtor company. If so, there may be less reason to object to liquidating CCAAs,
even if they do not fulfill the CCAA’s purpose of keeping a company going despite
insolvency. However, it is important to recall that jobs and business relationships are not
the only factors that fall within the public interest. As discussed in Chapter 3, other
factors may also be relevant. For example, the interests of pensioners may be relevant as
well, particularly where the debtor manages a company pension plan. This issue will be
discussed below in Part (v).
(iv) Resolving the Disagreement: Century Services and the Purpose of the CCAA
'l'in

Shortly before section 36 came into force, one commentator stated:
Section 36 o f the proposed amendments to the CCAA w illprovide courts across the
country with the opportunity o f re-assessing the approach to liquidating CCAAs. In that
process, it is hoped that a broader examination o f the divergent approaches in the various
provinces will result in a more consistent and predictable approach to liquidating CCAAs

3j3 Re Canadian Red Cross Society (1998), 5 CBR (4th) 299 (Ont CJ [Commercial List]).
334 Re 1078385 Ontario Ltd (22 November 2004), (Ont Sup Ct); leave to appeal refused, [2004] OJ No
6050 (Ont CA).
335 Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs - Are We Praying to False Gods?” [2008] Ann Rev o f Insol
L 33 at 52.
336 Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd v Fisgard Capital Corp, 2008 BCCA 327 at para 32.
337 Bill Kaplan, “Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?” [2008] Ann Rev o f Insol L 79 at 130.
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across the country. The fact that each province shares a fundamentally consistent view o f
the policies and objectives o f the statute, argues well for that process.

Although section 36 is still fairly new, a reassessment of liquidating CCAAs as suggested
above now seems unlikely.

The debate over liquidating CCAAs stems from

irreconcilable interpretations of the Act. Alberta and British Columbia courts have said
that they will approve liquidating CCAAs only in very exceptional circumstances.
Meanwhile, courts in Ontario and Québec have continued to approve liquidating CCAAs
since the 2009 amendments, with section 36 appearing to have no substantive effect on
the judicial analysis of asset sale plans.
While section 36 has proved unhelpful, some guidance on the liquidation vs.
reorganization question may be found in the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision of
Century Services v Canada (Attorney General).338339In Century Services, the Supreme Court
directly interpreted the provisions of the CCAA for the first time. In its analysis, the
Court identified the twofold purpose of the CCAA as follows:340
[T]he purpose o f the CCAA - Canada’s first reorganization statute - is to permit the
debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and
economic costs o f liquidating its assets.

This is a clear statement that the CCAA is intended to facilitate the reorganization of
insolvent companies so that they may continue on a going concern basis. Furthermore, in
distinguishing between restructuring and liquidation, the Court stated that the liquidation
of a debtor company’s assets should occur only where restructuring has failed:341
There are three ways of exiting CCAA proceedings. The best outcome is achieved when
the stay o f proceedings provides the debtor with some breathing space during which

338 Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009), 56 CBR (5th) 224 (Ont Sup Ct); Re Canwest Global Communications
Corp, 2009 CarswellOnt 7169 (Ont Sup Ct); Re White Birch Paper Holding Co, 2010 QCCS 4915 (Que
Sup Ct).
339 Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60.
340 Ibid at para 15.
341 Ibid at para 14 (emphasis added). The question o f what constitutes the “failure” o f a restructuring
process will be discussed further below in the analysis o f Indalex.
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solvency is restored and the CCAA process terminates without reorganization being
needed. The second most desirable outcome occurs when thedebtor’s compromise or
arrangement is accepted by its creditors and the reorganized company emerges from the
CCAA proceedings as a going concern. Lastly, if the compromise or arrangement fails,
either the company or itscreditors usually seek to have the debtor’s assets liquidated
under the applicable provisions o f the BIA or toplace the debtor into receivership.

Taken together, these statements from the Supreme Court suggest that it is generally
inappropriate to use the CCAA to effect a liquidation in which the insolvent company’s
business does not continue as a going concern. Although Century Services does not
preclude liquidating CCAAs of this kind, the Court states that liquidations are a last
resort and the least desirable outcome of a CCAA proceeding. In the above statement,
the Court also says that the liquidation of a debtor company following a failed CCAA
restructuring should follow the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act (BIA).342 This is further reason to question the appropriateness of liquidating CCAAs
in general, since the CCAA contains no liquidation provisions similar to the BIA.
Despite Century Services, proponents of liquidating CCAAs may still argue that
liquidating CCAAs are desirable where they avoid the negative consequences of
liquidations under the BIA. For example, there are circumstances in which the sale of
substantially all of the debtor company’s assets on a going concern basis is achieved
more efficiently under the CCAA than through a receivership. In these cases, insolvency
administrators will avoid adopting certain liabilities of the debtor company - for
environmental damage, for example - because they do not take control of the debtor
company’s assets as they would in a receivership.34334Specifically, the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in TCT Logistics^held that a receiver under the BIA could be a
successor employer and that the courts should allow successorship questions to be
342 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3.
343 Bill Kaplan, “Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?” [2008] Ann Rev o f Insol L 79 at 89.
344 GMAC Commercial Credit Corporation - Canada v TCT Logistics Inc, 2006 SCC 35.
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determined by labour relations boards.

Given this ruling, insolvency administrators

might favour the CCAA over a receivership in order to avoid successor employer
liabilities.

Proponents of liquidating CCAAs may argue that, as a practical matter,

liquidating CCAAsare preferable to receiverships where the results are better for the
stakeholders, either by maximizing returns for creditors, ensuring continuation of the
debtor’s business as a going concern, or both.345 However, the fact that a liquidating
CCAA may be more practical than a receivership does not mean that it is appropriate.3463478
The basic problem with liquidating CCAAs is twofold.

Firstly, the CCAA is

insolvency legislation, while liquidation is a bankruptcy process.The Supreme Court first
recognized this important distinction in Reference re Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement
Act™
Therefore, if the proceedings under this new Act o f 1933 are not, strictly speaking,
“bankruptcy” proceedings, because they had not for object the sale and division o f the
assets o f the debtor, they may, however, be considered as “insolvency proceedings” with
the object o f preventing a declaration o f bankruptcy and the sale o f these assets, if the
creditors directly interested for the time being reach the conclusion that an opportune
arrangement to avoid such sale would better protect their interest, in whole or in part.

In Century Services, the Court again recognized the distinction between the bankruptcy
t

t

and insolvency processes in Canadian law:

-140

Certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a
debtor to obtain a court order by staying its creditors’ enforcement actions and attempt to
obtain a binding compromise. . . Alternatively, the debtor’s assets may be liquidated and
debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules. The former is usually
referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation.

Significantly, the Court went on to say that the liquidation and distribution scheme of the
BIA “supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a CCAA reorganization is ultimately

345 Shelley C Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs - Are We Praying to False Gods?” [2008] Ann Rev o f Insol
L 33 at 52.
346 Ibid.
347 Reference re Companies ’ Creditors Arrangement Act, [1934] SCR 659 at para 17.
348 Ibid.
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unsuccessful.”349350This is another clear statement by the Supreme Court that liquidation
under the CCAA should only occur after restructuring has failed, and then only according
to the liquidation provisions of the BIA. This calls into question the appropriateness of
liquidating CCAAs, approved by courts in Ontario and Québec, in which no plan is
presented for the successful reorganization and continuation of the debtor company.
Such plans cannot fall within the Court’s meaning of restructuring as expressed in
Century Services, since they do not contemplate any attempts to save the debtor
company.

Rather, they are liquidation plans, undertaken without reference to the

liquidation and distribution processes of the BIA that should apply.
The second basic problem with liquidating CCAAs relates to the purpose of the
Act. As discussed above, the CCAA is intended to facilitate the rehabilitation of the
debtor company. Whatever the terms used - reorganization, rehabilitation, restructuring,
or rescue - the goal of the CCAA is to facilitate the survival of the debtor company. In
Century Services, the Supreme Court recognized that Parliament’s original purpose in
•
350
enacting the CCAA was to avoid liquidations where possible:

Parliament understood when adopting the CCAA that liquidation o f an insolvent company
was harmful for most o f those it affected - notably creditors and employees - and that a
workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal.

This statement of the CCAA’s purpose echoes earlier commentaries. During the first
reading of the CCAA in Parliament in 1933, the Secretary of State C.H. Cahan stated that
the Act was intended “to arrange for a settlement or compromise of the debts of the
company in such a way as to permit the company effectively to continue its business by
reorganization.”351 The CCAA was a response to the many corporate failures of the Great

349 Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at para 23.
350 Ibid at para 17.
351 House o f Commons Debates, 17th Pari, 4th Sess, No 4 (1932-33) at 4090 (Hon CH Cahan).
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Depression and was intended to prevent future failures and premature liquidations.352
This purpose was reiterated in Stanley Edwards’ seminal article “Reorganizations Under
the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act”,

the only scholarly publication on the

CCAA in the early decades following its enactment. In his article, Edwards stated that
the object of the CCAA was “to keep a company going despite insolvency” and thus
avoid the negative social and economic consequences of a premature liquidation.3
53354 In
Edwards’ view, this purpose made the CCAA an important part of Canada’s bankruptcy
and insolvency regime should another depression occur:355
If there should b e...a depression it will become particularly important that an adequate
reorganization procedure should be in existence, so that the Canadian economy will not
be permanently injured by discontinuance o f its industries, so that whatever going
concern value the insolvent companies have will not be lost though dismemberment and
sale o f their assets, so that their employees will not be thrown out o f work, and so that
large numbers o f investors will not be deprived o f their claims and their opportunity to
share in the fruits o f the future activities o f corporations.

Similarly, in Creditor Rights and the Public Interest,356357Janis Sarra explains that the
CCAA was enacted to allow insolvent companies to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation
where possible. The aim was to permit “workable and equitable” restructuring plans that
had a reasonable chance of success:
An effective reorganization scheme would assist in preserving going-concern value o f
insolvent companies that had a good chance o f survival, prevent the loss o f many jobs,
and help ensure that investors and creditors were not deprived o f their claims or the
opportunity to share in the value o f future activities o f the company.

In Sarra’s view, this purpose reflected Parliament’s intention that courts in CCAA
proceedings should consider the broader interests at stake in cases of corporate failure.
These interests included those of consumers, investors, employees and the public

353 Stanley E Edwards, (1947) 25 Can Bar Rev 587.
354 Ibid at 592.
355 Ibid at 590.
356 Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (Toronto:
University o f Toronto Press, 2003).
357 Ibid at 14.
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generally.3583596012
When the CCAA came into use again in the 1980s, early decisions again pointed to
the Act’s underlying purpose of preserving the debtor company. In 1984, the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench released Meridian v. T.D. Bank,3i9 in which it stated:
The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allows a judge to make orders which
will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts
to gain the approval o f its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the
company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit o f both the
company and its creditors.

This interpretation was reiterated in Oakwood Petroleums

in 1988 and has been cited

frequently in CCAA decisions since.
(v) The Indalex Decision
Indalex

involved a claim under the Ontario Pensions Benefits Act (PBA)

by

pensioners of a debtor company that had sold its assets in a liquidating CCAA. Indalex
filed for protection under the CCAA in the Ontario Superior Court, obtained debtor-in
possession (DIP) financing and began the process of selling its assets on a going concern
basis. In exchange for their loans, the DIP lenders received a guarantee and a super
priority charge over the proceeds of the going concern sale.364 However, the proceeds of
this sale were insufficient to satisfy both the DIP lenders’ claim and the claim of
pensioners under the company-administered plan. The pensioners pointed to section 57
of the PBA, which created a statutory deemed trust in their favour, and argued that the
trust had priority over the DIP lenders’ charge. The CCAA judge disagreed and held that

358 Ibid at 15.
359 Meridian Developments Inc v Toronto-Dominion Bank (1984) 52 CBR (NS) 109 (Alta QB).
360 Norcen Energy Resources Ltd v Oakwood Petroleums Ltd (1988), 72 CBR (NS) 1 (Alta QB) at para 61.
361 See, for example, Re United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd (2000), 16 CBR (4th) 141 (BCCA) at paras

10- 12.
362 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265.
363 Pensions Benefits Act, RSO 1990, c P8.
364 Ibid at para 53.
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the DIP lenders’ claim had priority over the pensioners.
The Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s decision and gave effect to the
deemed trust over the super-priority charge.36536 The Court further held that Indalex had
breached its fiduciary duties as administrator of the pension plan, and that this gave rise
to a constructive trust over the proceeds of the asset sale. Therefore, in the event that the
statutory deemed trust did not have priority over the DIP lenders’ charge, a constructive
trust would apply so as to satisfy the pensioners’ claim.
Indalex is significant on the issue of liquidating CCAAs for at least two reasons.
Firstly, the Court of Appeal clearly distinguished between a liquidating CCAA and a
restructuring. This was a point of contention between the parties in the Superior Court
proceedings. Counsel for the pensioners brought a motion arguing that since the Indalex
plan was a liquidating CCAA and not a restructuring, it was inappropriate to use the
CCAA to stay the pensioners’ benefits claims against Indalex.367368 In his decision rejecting
the pensioners’ motion, Morawetz J. stated:
I fail to see the relevance o f this submission. At the present time, the Applicants are
properly under CCAA protection. No motion has been brought to challenge the
appropriateness o f CCAA proceedings and, in my view, nothing in the CCAA precludes
the ability o f a debtor applicant to sell its assets.

Morawetz J. went on to distinguish the British Columbia case of Doman Industries,369 in
which Tysoe J., as he then was, held that it is insufficient for a CCAA court to authorize
the termination of a debtor company’s contracts merely on the basis that doing so will
reduce the debtor’s costs.370 Counsel for the pensioners had relied on Doman in arguing

365 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 at para 207.
366 Ibid at para 197.
367 Re Indalex Limited (2009), 55 CBR (5th) 64 at para 14.
368 Re Indalex Limited (2009), 55 CBR (5th) 64 at para 15.
369 Re Doman Industries Ltd, 2004 BCSC 733.
370 Re Indalex Limited (2009), 55 CBR (5th) 64 at para 17.
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that Indalex should not be allowed to forego its payments to pensioners simply because
this would reduce costs. Morawetz J. distinguished Doman on the basis that it concerned
statutory “replaceable contracts” in which the debtor company would have to offer a new
contract on expiry of the old as long as the other contracting party was not in default, a
contractual situation which he considered much different from that between Indalex and
its pensioners.
While the reasons for decision on the pensioners’ motion do not elaborate on the
issue of liquidating CCAAs, counsel for Indalex argued in its motion factum that the sale
of substantially all of Indalex’s assets on a going concern basis should not be
characterized as a liquidating CCAA. According to this argument, the Indalex plan was a
restructuring because it resulted in the continuation of Indalex’s business. In its factum,
•

counsel for Indalex submitted:

071

Contrary to the assertions o f the Retired Executives, this is not a “liquidating CCAA”,
this is a complex cross-border restructuring involving the going concern sale o f the assets
o f the Applicants. . . The anticipated result o f these proceedings is a successful going
concern solution and accordingly, these proceedings are anything but a “liquidating
CCAA”.

The Court of Appeal disagreed:

-3 7 7

Recall that this was a “liquidating CCAA” from the outset. There was no restructuring o f
the company. There was no plan o f compromise or arrangement prepared and presented
to creditors. Within days o f obtaining CCAA protection, Indalex began a marketing
process to sell itself. Very shortly thereafter, it sold its business as a going-concern.

In the Court of Appeal’s view, the purpose of the CCAA was “to facilitate the
restructuring of failing businesses to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation.”

Although it

distinguished between the Indalex liquidating CCAA and a restructuring, the Court of3712

371 In the Matter o f a Plan o f Compromise or Arrangement of Indalex Limited, Indalex Holdings (B.C) Ltd.,
6326765 Canada Inc. and Novar Inc, Ontario Superior Court o f Justice (Commercial List), Factum o f the
Applicants, July 1, 2009 at para 16. Online: <http://cfcanada.fticonsulting.com/indalex/docs/Factum.pdf>.
372 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 at para 180.
373 Ibid at para 180.
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Appeal apparently saw the Indalex sale process as appropriate because it preserved value
for suppliers and customers as well as approximately 950 jobs for former employees.374375
However, in a surprising decision, the Court of Appeal also held that granting the
pensioners’ deemed trust priority over the DIP lenders’ charge would not have frustrated
the plan, since Indalex merely intended to sell itself. Consequently, while the Court of
Appeal did not object to the liquidating CCAA as such, it nonetheless removed an
incentive for debtors to pursue similar sales in the future, stating: “[t]he CCAA was not
-27c

designed to allow a company to avoid its pension obligations.”

It is also notable that the Indalex plan provided for the survival of the underlying
business and the preservation of jobs. This is the least objectionable type of liquidating
CCAA because it avoids the negative social and economic consequences of bankruptcy
such as the loss of jobs. However, given the Court of Appeal’s statement that the CCAA
is intended to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation, it seems unlikely that the Court would
have approved of the Indalex plan if the plan had contemplated merely a piecemeal
liquidation with no continuing business.376In sum, without explicitly questioning the
appropriateness of liquidating CCAAs, Indalex may have a chilling effect on such sales
in the future. As Janis Sarra noted in a 2006 study, unfunded pension liabilities “have
been the driver of a significant number of recent CCAA filings.”377 By favoring
pensioners over DIP lenders in a CCAA proceeding, the Court of Appeal in Indalex may
discourage future filings.

j74 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 at para 182.
375 Ibid at para 199.
376 Ibid at para 180.
377 Janis Sarra, “Development o f a Model to Track Filings and Collect Data for Proceedings Under the
CCAA”, Final Report to the Office o f the Superintendent o f Bankruptcy Canada (March 2006), online:
<http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01669.html>
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(vi) The Future of Liquidating CCAAs Post-Indalex
The Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Indalex rejects the notion that a going concern
sale of substantially all of a debtor company’s assets is functionally equivalent to a
restructuring in which the debtor company survives.

The Court of Appeal stated that

the Indalex plan was a liquidating CCAA and not a restructuring because no plan was
prepared and presented to creditors and Indalex merely intended to sell itself.378379 As
discussed in part (ii) of this chapter, the better view is that the term “liquidating CCAA”
covers a range of possible transactions that may include both going concern sales and
sales in which the business operations of the debtor cease. The fact that some types of
liquidating CCAAs involve going concern sales that result in the continuation of a
debtor’s business does not make them the same as a restructuring.
In identifying the Indalex sale process as a liquidating CCAA, the Ontario Court
of Appeal may have brought itself one step closer to the Alberta and British Columbia
Courts of Appeal on this issue. Specifically, those courts have distinguished between
liquidating CCAAs and an actual restructuring, in which a plan is presented to the
creditors.

However, Western courts have taken the additional step of questioning

whether liquidating CCAAs are appropriate at all, encouraging the sales through
receivership or bankruptcy instead.380 There was no discussion of this possibility in the
Indalex decision, and it seems that the Ontario and Western courts part company on this
point. Still, by identifying the Indalex sale process as a liquidating CCAA, the Ontario

378 As mentioned earlier, counsel for Indalex advanced this argument at trial. For a recent commentary also
advancing this argument, see Karma Dolkar, “Re-Thinking “Rescue”: A Critical Examination o f CCAA
Liquidating Plans” (2010), forthcoming in Banking and Finance Law Review (2011). Online:
<http://www.insolvency.ca/docs/writingAwards/file20101111060008163 .pdf>.
379 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 at para 180.
380 Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd v Fisgard Capital Corp, 2008 BCCA 327 at para 32; Royal Bank
v Fracmaster Ltd (1999), 11 CBR (4th) 230 (Alta CA) at paras 15-16.
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Court of Appeal may have opened the door to further discussion of this issue in the
future.
An important problem with the Indalex decision is that the Court of Appeal
seemed to view the Indalex liquidating CCAA as a success because it resulted in the
going concern sale and continuation of the debtor’s business “albeit through another
entity.”381 This raises two related issues.
The first issue is how to define “liquidating CCAA.” The Ontario Court of
Appeal in Indalex emphasized that the CCAA was intended to avoid bankruptcy and
liquidation, but saw no problem with characterizing the Indalex liquidating CCAA as a
success.382 The Court of Appeal explained that the Indalex liquidating CCAA was
different from a piecemeal liquidation because it resulted in the continuation of the
debtor’s business. On this basis, the Court of Appeal distinguished Century Services
because that case involved a failed restructuring in which “liquidation on a piecemeal
basis through bankruptcy was inevitable.”383 This is a questionable distinction because
Century Services explains what should happen in CCAA proceedings in both successful
and unsuccessful cases. In Century Services, the Supreme Court specifically said that the
continuation of the debtor’s business as a going concern is the ideal result of CCAA
proceedings, whereas liquidation - under either the BIA or through a receivership typically occurs only after a failed restructuring.384 While this statement by the Supreme
Court does not preclude liquidating CCAAs, the fact that they are not mentioned as one
of the ways to exit CCAA proceedings speaks against their widespread use and against
381

Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 at para 188.
IbiddX para 188.
383
Ibid
384
Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at para 14.
382
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the suggestion in Indalex that a form of liquidation can be termed “successful” in the
context of the CCAA, which is a restructuring statute. Furthermore, although it is true in
the case of the Indalex sale process, the Court of Appeal’s suggestion that a liquidating
CCAA is different from piecemeal liquidation is not true in all cases. The problem lies
with the ambiguity of the term “liquidating CCAA”, which has been used to refer both to
going concern sales and piecemeal liquidations. Until Parliament or the Supreme Court
of Canada clarifies the meaning of this term, it would be preferable if counsel and the
courts specified what kind of liquidating CCAAs they mean to discuss, referring to the
spectrum of scenarios discussed in Part (ii). That is, a liquidating CCAA might refer to
the sale of substantially all of the debtor company’s assets to: (a) a single buyer who
intends to continue the business operations of the debtor company; (b) many buyers who
intend to continue different parts of the business operations, or (c) many buyers who have
no intention of continuing the business operations of the debtor company.
The second issue is how to define success in CCAA proceedings. The Court of
Appeal viewed the Indalex liquidating CCAA as a success because it enhanced value for
IOC

employees, customers and suppliers by keeping the business going.

As a preliminary

point, “success” in the restructuring context is often a murky concept. A company might
emerge from CCAA protection only to fail six months or a year later. On the other hand,
a company might prosper for reasons that have nothing to do with its restructuring plan.
In a recent article for the Annual Review o f Insolvency Law, Blair J.A. of the Ontario
Court of Appeal summarized the problem as follows:

TOC

Moreover, what does “success” mean? Is it enough to say “implementation o f the court-3856

385 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 at para 188.
386 Robert Blair, “The CCAA Over 30 Years: From Chrysalis to Butterfly or Chrysalis to Gadfly? Some
Thoughts From an Appellate Perspective” [2010] Ann Rev o f Insol L 557 at 566.
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approved plan”? What about pre-packaged asset sales or other cases where there may be
a satisfactory resolution, but no plan approval. . . Does there have to be some broader
“public interest” dimension, like the continuation o f the business in its present or a
different form? I don’t know. I’m just asking.

The Supreme Court may have provided an answer to these questions in Century Services.
As discussed in Part (iv) of this chapter, the Court in Century Services suggested that
liquidation should normally occur only when restructuring has failed. Specifically, the
Court stated that the most desirable outcome of a CCAA proceeding is that the debtor
company survives and emerges from insolvency.

If this outcome is the basic measure

of success, then a liquidating CCAA cannot be an unqualified success because it involves
the demise of the debtor company. Nonetheless, Ontario courts have focused on the
survival of the underlying business rather than the debtor company.

This approach

favours going concern sales because they can preserve jobs and existing relationships
with customers and suppliers. However, this approach may ignore the fact that there are
other public interests at stake in CCAA proceedings, such as the preservation of pensions.
The Ontario Court of Appeal in Indalex got around this problem by focusing on the
fiduciary duties that the company owed to its pensioners, giving priority to the pensioners
over the DIP lenders. However, this approach required a questionable distinction about
why Century Services did not apply to the Indalex situation. For these reasons, and the
fact that the CCAA is primarily a reorganization statute designed to keep the debtor
company going despite insolvency, liquidating CCAAs should be viewed with
skepticism.
Indalex may discourage some future liquidating CCAAs in Ontario because debtor
companies and potential purchasers in CCAA sales will no longer enjoy the same

387 Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at para 14.
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protection from the enforcement of obligations to pensioners.

Arguably, a debtor

company or its secured creditors could find ways around this problem by filing an
application for a bankruptcy order before entering CCAA protection, forcing
beneficiaries of the debtor company’s pension plan to negotiate at the risk of losing their
ion

claims entirely should the company become bankrupt.

However, there is a word of

caution here from both the trial and appellate decisions in Indalex. At trial, Campbell J.
stated:3839390
In my view, a voluntary assignment under the BIA should not be used to defeat a secured
claim under valid Provincial legislation, unless the Provincial legislation is in direct
conflict with the provisions o f Federal Insolvency Legislation such as the CCAA or the
BIA. For that reason I did not entertain the bankruptcy assignment motion first.

The Court of Appeal reiterated this view in its decision:391
As for the suggestion that Indalex will pursue its bankruptcy motion in order to defeat the
deemed trust, I would simply echo the comments o f the CCAA judge that a voluntary
assignment into bankruptcy should not be used to defeat a secured claim under valid
provincial legislation. I would add this additional consideration: it is inappropriate for a
CCAA applicant with a fiduciary duty to pension plan beneficiaries to seek to avoid those
obligations to the benefit o f a related party by invoking bankruptcy proceedings when no
other creditor seeks to do so.

Given the above statements, debtor companies seeking to take advantage of the BIA’s
reversal of some priority claims - in effect using the threat of bankruptcy to gain leverage
in negotiations with claimants like pensioners - may be seriously limited. Where the
debtor is also the administrator of its employees’ pension plans, courts will expect it to
act in a manner consistent with its fiduciary obligations to pensioners. Presumably, in

388 It is beyond the scope o f this paper to discuss the issues o f priorities and paramountcy that arise here in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Century Services, which Gillese J.A. discussed at length in
Indalex. The point in mentioning this is simply that debtor companies, as well as lenders, may no longer
enjoy guaranteed protection against such claims in Ontario. As this was an incentive for applying for
CCAA protection in the past, Indalex may deter future applications, particularly those contemplating a plan
that might be characterized as a liquidating CCAA.
389 At least one Toronto restructuring lawyer has suggested that this is more or less what will happen if
Indalex is not reversed or narrowed on appeal.
390 Re Indalex Limited, 2010 ONSC 1114 at para 55.
391 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 at para 183.
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such cases, it would fall to other secured creditors of the debtor company to negotiate
directly with the pensioners in order to achieve a workable restructuring plan. This
would be a desirable outcome because of the public interest purpose of the CCAA, as
discussed here and in Chapter III. The Canadian restructuring regime is not merely a tool
to facilitate the maximization of returns for creditors. Ideally, as the Supreme Court
stated in Century Services, CCAA proceedings will lead to the continuation of the debtor
company as a going concern to the benefit of all stakeholders. Even where the debtor
company does not survive, Indalex is a reminder that other stakeholders besides secured
creditors may have significant interests in the outcome of CCAA proceedings - interests
that the court should recognize and balance with those of the secured creditors.
(vii) Conclusion
Liquidating CCAAs should be viewed with skepticism, especially where there is no
intention to continue the debtor company’s business. This is because the CCAA is
primarily a statute for reorganizing insolvent companies rather than liquidating them.
Chapter IV explained why the addition of section 36 of the Act merely answers the
question of whether CCAA courts have the jurisdictional authority to approve asset sales
- it does not solve the problem of liquidating CCAAs because it does not provide specific
criteria for determining when a liquidating CCAA will be appropriate.
The fundamental question is under what circumstances a liquidating CCAA is
appropriate. Some commentators, such as Baird and Rasmussen, have argued that courts
should focus on maximizing sale value.

However, in Canada, the CCAA was not

originally intended as a liquidation statute.

The recent Supreme Court of Canada

decision Century Services suggests that the sale of assets, whether piecemeal or on a
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going concern basis, and the winding up of the debtor’s business is best accomplished
typically through bankruptcy or receivership rather than the CCAA. Nonetheless, some
courts will continue to see liquidation, particularly going concern sales, as an attractive
option in CCAA proceedings.
In Ontario, the focus of the court’s analysis remains the survival of the underlying
business rather than the debtor company itself.

This approach favours liquidating

CCAAs where they can preserve jobs and value for consumers and suppliers through a
going concern sale of the debtor’s business. In such cases, it is important to recall the
public interest purpose of the CCAA that the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized in
Century Services. Jobs, customers and suppliers are not the only factors that are captured
by the “public interest.” In Indalex, the Ontario Court of Appeal approved of a liquidating
CCAA in which the debtor company’s underlying business was saved, but refused to
allow the company to pay its DIP lenders before its pensioners. Although the Court of
Appeal focused on the fiduciary obligations of the debtor to its pensioners rather than on
pensions as a public interest factor under the CCAA, this decision is a reminder that
pensions are an important consideration in CCAA proceedings. In the future, a more
robust public interest analysis that takes into account pensions, in addition to jobs and
suppliers, would be desirable because it would allow the CCAA court to engage in a fair
balancing of these interests without inviting controversies over paramountcy or the
interaction of the CCAA with other areas of law such as fiduciary obligations.
Furthermore, this might avoid future appeals where groups of stakeholders, such as
pensioners, claim that their interests have been ignored in the CCAA process. Hopefully,
this will lead to a more restrained approach toward liquidating CCAAs in Ontario and
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Québec in the future, as courts in these provinces ask in broader terms, and perhaps more
skeptically, whether the public interest is being served. Should this come to pass, it
would be a welcome change both with respect to the underlying purposes of the CCAA
and the development of a more consistent, predictable approach to the CCAA in courts
across Canada.

106

CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the problem of CCAA liquidations in light of the
CCAA’s history, purpose and place in Canada’s bankruptcy and insolvency system. This
thesis began by asking two questions:
1) Are liquidations appropriate under the CCAA?
2) If so, under what circumstances?
This thesis has argued that CCAA liquidations should be approached with caution
because generally they are not consistent with the purposes of the statute. However,
where restructuring has failed, or where all stakeholders are better served - including
those captured by the broad concept of the “public interest” - liquidation under the
CCAA may be appropriate. The key to this analysis is defining the types of liquidations
contemplated and the likely effects on the broad constituency of stakeholders in a
restructuring.
Chapter I began by suggesting that the CCAA historically was intended as a
statute for restructuring companies so that they could avoid liquidation.

Chapter II

examined several leading decisions on the CCAA in light of the historical purposes of the
statute.

Based on this discussion, Chapter III considered competing theories of

restructuring in order to develop a robust account of the CCAA’s purpose and place in
Canada’s bankruptcy and insolvency system, giving particular attention to the “public
interest” purpose of the statute and the debate over liquidations. Chapter IV explained
why the 2009 amendments have not answered the fundamental questions raised by
CCAA liquidations.

Finally, Chapter V analyzed the liquidation vs. reorganization

debate in detail. Chapter V suggested that CCAA liquidations should be approached with
caution, both because the statute was designed to facilitate reorganization rather than
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liquidation and because the “public interest” purpose of the CCAA often is engaged in
liquidation scenarios.
Chapter V also suggested that a more robust concept of the public interest, applied
rigorously by the courts, could help to avoid the sorts of problems faced in recent
decisions such as Indalex,

in which the Court of Appeal for Ontario applied fiduciary

law to alter the priority of creditors in a CCAA proceeding as established by the lower
court.

Even if the result in Indalex was desirable, the decision has created greater

uncertainty for participants in restructuring proceedings because the various outcomes of
the CCAA’s interaction with other areas of the law, including the common law on
fiduciary obligations, are unclear. This situation can be remedied by adopting a more
robust “public interest” analysis in CCAA proceedings that would address the concerns,
raised in cases such as Indalex, that some stakeholders are treated unfairly in the
restructuring process. For example, as discussed in Chapter V, a broader concept of the
public interest, which would include the interests of pensioners of the debtor company,
could be considered and balanced with the interests of traditionally recognized groups
such as lenders. Such an approach - whether it is developed in the courts or codified
through amendments to the CCAA - would lead both to greater certainty and greater
consistency in CCAA proceedings in the different provinces.
At least three changes to the current restructuring regime could provide greater
clarity and certainty with respect to CCAA liquidations.Thus far, courts have not engaged
in. an analysis of the public interest in CCAA proceedings as a matter of course. This
thesis argues that courts should always engage in such an analysis, especially when392

392 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265.
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public interest stakeholders must bear the consequences of CCAA proceedings.Far from
muddying the waters, such an. approach offers greater clarity than the current one, in
which issues of environmental damage or pension liabilities of insolvent companies are
not considered in lower courts’ analyses and are left for consideration only in appellate
decisions.393 This has led to great surprise and uncertainty in cases, like Indalex, where an
appellate court has decided that the CCAA does not necessarily allow a court to ignore
the claims of pensioners.
Secondly, a more robust analysis of what is meant by the public interest is
necessary. The term “public interest” is often used but rarely defined in either the case
law or the literature.

If either the Supreme Court of Canada or Parliament were to

provide a definition, such as a non-exhaustive list of factors that fall under the public
interest analysis, all participants in the CCAA process would have a better idea of what to
expect.
Finally, it is crucial to distinguish between the different types of liquidations that
might occur under the CCA A because some types of liquidations are more objectionable
than others. The term “liquidating CCAA” might refer to the sale of substantially all of
the debtor company’s assets to: (a) a single buyer who intends to continue the business
operations of the debtor company; (b) many buyers who intend to continue different parts
of the business operations, or (c) many buyers who have no intention of continuing the
business operations of the debtor company.

Where a liquidation actually serves the

purposes of the CCAA by avoiding the negative social and economic consequences that
otherwise would befall the stakeholders of the insolvent company, then a liquidation will
393 The Abitibi and Indalex cases are good examples o f how the CCAA court’s inability or unwillingness to
address the interaction o f the CCAA with environmental or pension liabilities o f the insolvent company has
led to appeals to the Supreme Court o f Canada.
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be appropriate. It is implicit in this approach that the “stakeholders” are broadly defined,
since the public interest is a broad concept that refers to many different interest groups
and factors.
It is hoped that these changes will facilitate a reasoned, cautious approach to
liquidating CCAAs in which the interests of all those affected by a liquidation are
considered and all stakeholders are encouraged to participate in the process.

This

approach reflects the Supreme Court of Canada’s statement in Century Services that “the
chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common
ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances
permit.”394

394 Century Services v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at para 17.
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